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This study constitutes part of the "Support for Economic Reforms in Bulgaria" project conducted by
the Center for Economic and Social Research (CASE Research Foundation), Warsaw and financed by
the Open Society Institute, Budapest. The aim of the project is to assist co-operation with Bulgarian
counterparts in implementing structural reforms in the Bulgarian economy. At the request of the
Bulgarian authorities, this assistance involves developing and carrying out reform programs, as well as
evaluating their results in priority areas of structural and institutional reform, with particular reference
to the process of ownership transformation. This includes providing an overall strategy for
privatization and reporting its effects, monitoring the process of enterprise privatization, post-
privatization contract enforcement and the restructuring of newly privatized companies.
The purpose of this study is to:
?  describe and evaluate the fiscal dimension of the privatization process in Bulgaria and Poland
?  conduct a cross-country comparison of the fiscal effects of privatization in Bulgaria and Poland,
examining their respective approaches to the same
?  identify the crucial factors in the privatization strategy and policies of both countries that affect
their privatization revenues
?  provide background information for the possible transfer of know-how concerning the best
approach to maximizing the fiscal effects of privatization, by examining those positive and
negative aspects of Poland's experience that could prove relevant to Bulgaria's economic
environment
This study includes an evaluation of the fiscal effects of privatization in both countries in the period
since the very beginning of the process, i.e. in the case of Poland since 1990 and in the case of
Bulgaria since 1993. The cross-country comparison of the fiscal dimension of privatization has been
contingent on the privatization models, priorities and methods applied in both countries.
The research on the fiscal effects of privatization was undertaken by the CASE Research Foundation
and the Institute for Market Economy, Sofia, at the request of the Economic Policy Committee of the
Bulgarian Parliament. The independent assessment of the fiscal results of privatization the Committee
expects to receive will form part of an overall evaluation of the ownership transformation process in
the Bulgarian economy and the effectiveness of that process.
This study is to be a follow-up to the previous CASE and IME research and consultancy activities in
the area of privatization, both with regard to the Bulgarian and Polish cases and comparative studies.
The general analytical framework for these comparative studies is provided by the report from the
international research project entitled "Privatization in post-Communist countries", that was carried
out under the auspices of the CASE Research Foundation.1
The changing priorities of the Bulgarian government's privatization strategies, reflected in the varying
pace of the country's privatization process to 1998 was analyzed in the report  The Role of the Core
Executive in the Privatization Process.2 The current study is to verify and update conjunctions
between declared priorities, applied strategies and the fiscal effect of privatization.
                                                       
1 Blaszczyk, Barbara, Richard Woodward, (1996), Privatization in Post-Communist Countries: Experience,
Problems, and Conclusions, in: Barbara Blaszczyk, Richard Woodward (Eds.) Privatization in Post-Communist
Countries, Warsaw, CASE, Volume I
2 Stanchev, Krassen, Luisa Perrotti(1999), The Role of the Core Executive in the Privatization Process, Country
Report: Bulgaria, OECD/SIGMA - World Bank Project (Draft), Sofia
4The description of the various fiscal aspects of privatization will attempt to provide answers to the
following questions:
1. To what extent have budgetary revenues been a priority of the privatization programs and
strategies in Bulgaria and Poland?
2. What were dynamics of the revenues obtained from privatization in the two countries?
3. What role did specific privatization methods and techniques play in providing revenues?
4. What was the level of concentration of these revenues in the two countries i.e. the share of the
proceeds generated by privatization of major providers in total revenues from privatization?
5. What was the role of foreign investments in providing revenues from privatization?
6. What was the share of revenues from privatization in total budgetary income and GDP in the two
countries?
7. What form do allocation procedures take?
The evaluation of the fiscal effects of privatization in Bulgaria and Poland has been undertaken in
order to:
1. outline basic privatization procedures and identify links with other fiscal issues
2. identify similarities and differences in approaches to the privatization issue
3. identify comparable privatization methods and strategies
4. assess the "effectiveness" of these comparable methods in providing revenues from privatization
5. identify the most commercial privatization schemes and to assess the share of such schemes in
generating revenues
6. analyze limitations and the chances for increasing revenues from privatization, depending upon
methods applied.
There are two factors to justify the work undertaken for this report: the final stage of the privatization
process in Bulgaria and in Poland, which provides the ground for generall evaluation, and diverse
experience of both countries, in terms of applied approaches to privatization and their fiscal
dimensions, which gives the basis for comparison and transfer of know how. We hope that the
findings and conslusions will contribute in both countries to the public debate on the progress and
results of privatization process as a part of structural transformation.
5SUMMARY
Comparison of fiscal dimension of privatization process in Bulgaria and in Poland reveals both
similarities and differences.
On the contrary to Poland, where privatization proceeds have been one of the highest priorities of the
privatization strategy, fiscal objectives have rarely been referred to as a priority in the modeling and
execution of Bulgaria's privatization policy. During the transition period privatization served in
Bulgaria two important functions that directly affected fiscal affairs – 1) cash inflow into the central
budget and various non-budgetary accounts and 2) reduction of the national debt through the use of
government bonds as legal tender in privatization transactions. Since the very beginning of Bulgaria's
privatization process, both these functions have been subject to strict regulation.
The major fiscal objective of Bulgarian privatization has gradually changed from support of different
off-budget funds, i.e. different types of public spending, to official debt reduction. The Bulgarian
government's intention to use privatization to relieve the national debt burden is strengthened by the
possibility of using a variety of government bonds as payment instruments in privatization
transactions. The main aim of privatization is currently the reduction of foreign debt. This should
apply to the entire cash flow into the central budget, since no Brady bonds have been used as payment
instruments in privatization since 1997. Since an early-1999 amendment to the Privatization Act, 90%
of the cash revenues from privatization has flowed directly into the central budget (and not to 7 non-
budgetary accounts).
The Polish government has adopted a “multi-track” approach to privatization, using various methods
which it has been hoped will support the achievement of different objectives. Capital (or indirect)
privatization is aimed at providing the greatest revenues to the budget. In analyzing the fiscal
dimensions of Poland's privatization strategy for the 1990s, one cannot overestimate the importance of
the privatization of the banking sector. This program of privatizing state-owned banks was adopted at
the beginning of 1991.
Together with the evolution of a general privatization approaches, the allocation procedures for the
revenues obtained in both countries has been subject to subsequent changes.
Under the Polish Privatization Law of July 13, 1990, parliament passes an annual resolution setting
out a privatization agenda (referred as “Directions of Privatization”) for the Government to follow.
Due to increasing importance of revenues from privatization for the state budget, beginning in 1993
these “Directions” were included as an appendix to the Budget Law. From 1990 to 1997, the revenues
from privatization were included in the central budget and covered current budgetary needs. Since
1997 incomes from privatization began to be separated from the central budget. This was the result of
the consensus that revenues from privatization should not be consumed by current budgetary needs,
but should be earmarked to cover the cost of social programs and State Treasury obligations towards
Polish citizens.
The Polish “Privatization Program up to 2001”, adopted by the Government in 1998, for the first time
ever stipulated in a detailed manner the assignment of financial revenues obtained from the
privatization process. Of the social programs that are to be financed by revenues obtained from
privatization, the pension system reform is the most expensive one. The second program intended to
be financed through privatization incomes was the compensation program for 2.95 million employees
working in the non-productive State sector at the beginning of the 1990s and 1.3 million pensioners.
The restitution program is also to be covered by privatization revenues.
According to the 1999 and 2000 Budget Acts in Bulgaria, allocation of excess revenues is at the
discretion of the Council of Ministers. The latter will decide on revenues allocation ‘taking into
6account the execution of privatization programs and the financial restructuring of the real and banking
sectors according to the conditions of the three-year agreement with the IMF’.
In early 1993, at the beginning of the privatization process in Bulgaria, the total volume of state-
owned long-term assets was estimated to be BGN 580 million (USD 345 million). The total volume of
state-owned assets subject to privatization is BGN 383 million (USD 228 million) or 66% of the total
assets under state ownership/control. Prior to 2000, enterprises in infrastructure sectors (energy,
transportation, water supply and sewerage systems) were excluded from the scope of privatization. It
is estimated that about 30% of long-term tangible assets are held by infrastructure companies that for
the time being are not subject to privatization or would prove difficult to privatize. According to the
Program for the Privatization of State-owned Companies in 2000, some of these infrastructure
enterprises are scheduled for privatization.
The Polish Ministry of Ownership Transformation conducted the first official assessment of the value
of State property in 1995. As of 31st December 1994, the book value of the stocks and shares of State
Owned Enterprises, State financial institutions, commercialized State Enterprises and companies with
partial State Treasury participation was estimated at 75 billion PLN or 30.8 billion USD. The
estimated value of the State's productive sector as of 31st December 1997 was twice as much and
amounted 150 billion PLN or 42.9 billion USD.
The privatization process in Bulgaria and in Poland has been uneven in terms of both contracted
payments and cash revenues.
For the period 1993 – 1999, the total volume of cash proceeds from privatization in Bulgaria amounts
to approximately USD 1 billion. Privatization revenues have registered a continual increase since 1993
along with an increase in the number of transactions and volume of assets privatized. Privatization
proceeds were only 0.1% of GDP in the first year of the process, but reached 3.21% in 1997.
Privatization’s contribution to consolidated budget revenues became relatively significant after 1995,
when it reached 1.2% of budget revenues. The contribution was highest in 1997 – 9.9%.
Privatization revenues for the period 1991-1999 in Poland amounted to 11.878 million USD. The most
important from the budgetary point of view are revenues from indirect privatization and this share is
increasing almost every year. In 1999, the total share of indirect privatization, enterprises plus banks,
in total revenues reached 97%. Revenues from indirect privatization are also characterized by the most
regular real annual growth rate. Both, the share of privatization revenues in total budget revenues and
their share in GDP rises each year. The highest ratio of privatization revenues in Poland was in 1999
and amounted 9.58%.
The payments contracted by the central privatization bodies in Bulgaria have significantly exceeded
cash proceeds. On average, cash proceeds were 41% of contractual payments. Since 1998, the annual
programs of the privatization have included projected contractual payments. The actual payments
contracted significantly exceeded the plan.
Also in Poland for the last 6 years, the government has regularly underestimated privatization
revenues in any given fiscal year. The regular underestimation of revenues may suggest that
privatization was being treated as a hidden source of budget reserves.
The total share of obligations in privatization revenues in Poland is decreasing. This may be most
easily observed in the case of indirect privatization, which drives the total revenues. In the case of
direct privatization a prevailing number of the privatized companies have been leased to insiders, what
results in deferred payments, similarly to the Bulgarian MEBO buy-outs.
Concentration on revenues by source has been in both countries significant, since almost 44% of the
cash proceeds from privatization in Bulgaria have so far come from the top five transactions. Very
high is also the level of concentration of privatization revenues in terms of the major revenue
7providers in Poland. The share of the largest privatization contracts in total privatization revenues
tends to increase, especially over the last three years, i.e. 1997-1999.
The greatest number of large privatization transactions in Poland has been performed in the banking
sector (6), followed by the tobacco industry (4) and the cement and pharmaceutical industries (3).
The contractual revenues from transactions with foreign investors amounted in Bulgaria  to
approximately USD 825 million, i.e. 36% of the payments contracted by all central privatization
bodies. The volume of foreign direct investments through privatization (including direct payments and
liabilities of privatized companies undertaken) was USD 1.14 billion for the period 1993 – 1999, i.e.
42% of the total FDI volume for the period.
The share of foreign investors in total privatization revenues in Poland has been declining: from 78.7%
in 1991 up to 23.3% and 12.5% in 1997 and 1998 respectively. The ratio of revenues from transactions
concluded with foreign investors to total foreign direct investments for the last three years did not
exceeded 10%, and in 1998 declined even below 5% of FDI volume.
The privatizing agents in Bulgaria contracted the payments using several types of payment
instruments, including cash, government securities, vouchers and compensatory bonds (issued against
restitution claims). The main feature of all the regulations introduced to deal with the legal,
institutional and procedural aspects of the debt-equity swap mechanism in Bulgaria was debt
annulment by converting government debt in state assets. The total volume of government bonds
actually used as legal tender in privatization amounts to approximately USD 413 million, i.e. about
29% of actual payments (including cash and debt instruments). Almost 2/3 of the total volume of
government bonds used in privatization payments has been domestic debt bonds
The role of payment instruments other then cash would not seem to be an important factor in
privatization revenues in Poland. Only at the very beginning of the privatization process, some direct
privatization payments were carried out by Polish state treasury bonds.
Direct costs of privatization in both countries are relatively small and constitute a decreasing fraction
of privatization revenues. The costs of privatization in Bulgaria were on average 3.7% of the total cash
revenues from privatization. The greatest costs have been connected with the implementation of the
process, when the cost of the capital privatization in Poland amounted to 21% of privatization
revenues, following which the cost began to fall to the level of about 2% in 1998 and 1% in 1999..
1. STRATEGIES AND FISCAL OBJECTIVES OF PRIVATIZATION IN POLAND AND BULGARIA.
Privatization considered as a transfer of ownership of state owned assets to the private actors may have
various economic, social and political objectives. (Bornstein, 1992)  As a rule, the goal of privatization
is to maximize some combination of these objectives. The combinations resulting in privatization
strategy mix vary among the separate countries and could be subject to changes in each of them.
1.1. The Case of Bulgaria.
An analysis of the fiscal aspects of Bulgaria’s privatization process is somewhat hampered by the
changes that have occurred in the country's priorities and revenue allocation schemes over the last few
years. In this period, the government amended its rhetoric and policy-vision vis a vis privatization.
However, the overall organization of the institutions governing the process has never been seriously
8challenged, though it has undergone substantial reform and rationalization in accordance with
amendments to the privatization model.  The creation of new institutions and the work of existing ones
have supported these new approaches.
The first major characteristic of the Bulgarian privatization process concerned its so-called voucher
privatization. Naturally, this model had very limited fiscal effect. However, its purpose was not mass
privatization. This necessitated maintaining conventional privatization as a source of budget revenue.
At some point, however, this approach began to contradict the idea of auctioning vouchers for
enterprises in relatively good condition. This concept had been put forward since 1990, but it wasn't
until 1994 that it took shape under the cabinet of Mr. Berov. Subsequent cabinets have substantially
remodeled this originally very liberal project, which first and foremost aimed at reducing government
responsibility for the process.  It was applied on two occasions: the first time in 1995-1996, under a
socialist government and the second time, although in an entirely revised form, under the current
government, that took office in April 1997.  However, the impact of voucher privatization on the
disposal of State-owned assets has been relatively limited.
 
 Preparation of the first scheme began in 1995 but was only conducted between the end of 1996 and the
beginning of 1997: notably, when the socialist government then in power, already facing a crisis, was
also under considerable pressure from international financial institutions. The process resulted in 85
million shares being offered to the public, over 80% of which were sold.
 
The second wave of mass privatization began in February 1999. To reflect the government's policy
shift, the decision to resort to this method of privatization was based more on the need to accelerate
the overall process than, as in the previous case, an attempt to pursue objectives of ‘social fairness’.
As mentioned earlier, the second wave of mass privatization was conceived in a radically amended
form. Firstly, privatization funds were excluded from the process3 - although there are several different
ways of investing the vouchers (for instance, in pension funds). Secondly, the price at which shares are
acquired is not fixed but weighted against the average of all bids. A broad range of payment
instruments (including cash) is allowed, vouchers may not be traded and entirely new negotiable
instruments (‘compensatory bonds’) may be issued against claims on formerly nationalized properties,
to complement the ‘restitution’ side of the privatization program. Furthermore, unlike the situation in
1996, there is currently no fixed list of State-owned enterprises to be privatized by this method.
Instead, the policy provides for minority stakes (up to 5-10%) of all state-owned enterprises to be
offered to the general public at centralized bidding sessions.
It is not clear how such a limited percentage of shares could actually accelerate the privatization
process and thus improve overall economic and fiscal performance.  Moreover, only ‘unattractive’
companies are likely to be included in the scheme.  It is certainly too early to evaluate the effects of
this second wave of mass privatization. Indeed, the government's changing vision has not facilitated
the process but, compared to the first wave of mass privatization, has seriously affected economic
performance.
Management-employee buy-outs (MEBO) have been the second major component of Bulgaria's
privatization approach. The country's privatization law has introduced a special regime for
management-employee buy-outs (MEBO) and cash privatization transactions. In general, MEBOs are
not a typical phenomenon of any given set of governments, in particular, socialist-led governments.
Under the current reform-minded government, recourse to this preferential system has been justified
by the need to accelerate the disposal of State’s assets4. However, the institutional impact has been that
such transactions have in fact distributed the rights to re-sell formerly government-owned assets to
                                                       
3 In order to participate in this wave of mass privatization, in fact, the earlier funds are required to register as
investment intermediaries with the Securities and Exchange Commission.
4 Privatization Agency, Privatization Strategy and Program, no date (1999), p. 1.
9managers that were appointed by the government itself.5
It is generally considered that MEBOs fail to maximize fiscal revenues, tend to result in poor
corporate management and embody politically acceptable methods of liquidating public enterprises.
Indeed, MEBOs are often the solution applied when the firms involved have already accumulated
losses that decrease the value of their net assets and therefore, lower the sale price and the revenues
that can be expected. Furthermore, the increasing number of MEBOs tends to magnify some of the
most powerful constraints on the Bulgarian privatization process: for instance the built-in collateral
legislation concerning procedures for hiring and firing the management staff of State-owned
enterprises, as well as that concerning the appointment of Board members. Such legislation ultimately
enables the management of State-owned enterprises in various ways to obstruct or privatization or
make it conditional on other issues.  In June 2000, Bulgaria's Prime Minister publicly admitted for the
first time that obvious conflicts of interest exist in such privatization methods. The fall in the number
of MEBO transactions in 1999 to 43.5% of all privatization transactions is evidence of an awareness
that these companies are likely to perform badly in terms of efficiency and competitiveness.
Eventually, a market-driven economic system will take shape albeit gradually, once resale through
MEBO mediation is discontinued.
The third major feature, a relatively recent innovation, has been the policy of involving so-called
‘privatization intermediaries’. This selection of ‘privatization intermediaries’ from among
internationally reputed consulting firms, to perform as ‘agents’ of the government in the preparation of
large-scale privatization transactions constitutes an important and controversial development of the
current government's policy. The government decided that the presence of such intermediaries would
increase the level of foreign investment, improve privatization results and increase the transparency of
sales. Between 1997 and 1999, 170 enterprises were handled by such intermediaries. The 1999 Annual
Report on Privatization6 claims that ‘by the end of the year, the privatization process had gained
considerable momentum thanks to the privatization transactions handled by consultants and
intermediaries that began to predominate by the end of the first six months, due to the approaching
contract deadlines imposed under the regulations for the financial sanitation of state-owned
enterprises”.7  However, the report provides little evidence or information that could substantiate an
independent judgement.
Doubts have been cast on the procedure for selecting such intermediaries. Furthermore, the contracts
binding privatization intermediaries raise doubts about the real intentions behind this policy.
Particularly relevant is the fact that, with few notable exceptions, privatization intermediaries do not
operate on the basis of a ‘success fee’. Rather, their remuneration is in most cases fixed or mixed
(partly fixed and partly success fees).
Thus, although intermediaries are constrained by deadlines for the submission of bids for the
privatization transactions they are handling, they have no interest in speeding up the process if this
results in any reduction of their own returns8. On the other hand, the intermediaries that we consulted
                                                       
5 According to the Bulgarian Law (Council of Ministers Decree 7/1994) line ministers are principle of state-
owned enterprises; they appoint managers under no competition between management teams, there are no
performance guidelines and no venture capital elements of the management itself.  The tradition has been that
every new cabinet appoint new managers thus benefiting its party affiliates, paying back for loyalty and past
political services.
6 This report (the full title: A report on the Result of the Program to privatize State-owned Enterprises in 1999),
was compiled by the Privatization Agency and accepted by the Council of Ministers on March 28, 2000
(Decision 150/2000) is not yet publicly available, and, by the time of compilation of this draft, is still pending
hearings in the Parliament.
7 Report on the Result of the Program to Privatize State-owned Enterprises in 1999, p. 17.
8 For instance, the Privatization Agency expected to see finalized by 1999 ‘most part’ of the first 30 companies
offered for sale through privatization intermediaries in 1997 and 1998, whilst only six transactions had been
concluded between 1998 and early 1999 (Privatization strategy and Program, p. 3), while the recent report
(March 2000) does not disclose any specific information on this matter.
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expressed  concern that they were being treated as ‘scapegoats’ by the relevant decision-making
authorities. In fact, intermediaries are charged with preparing the sale of enterprises grouped into
industrial ‘pools’ listed by sector (i.e. metallurgy, tourism, chemicals, etc.). However, they have no
authority to ‘sign’ agreements. These must be submitted for approval to the privatization agency and
in the case of the country’s ‘blue chips’, to the Council of Ministers.
None of the above mentioned three components constituted the major source of revenues from
privatization. The major source were the negotiations and tenders and to a lesser extent the auctions
and the public offers on the Stock Exchange.
The Privatization Act of May 8th 1992 outlines the possible ways of privatizing state-owned and




? Direct negotiations with potential buyers.
? Public offer of stocks on the Stock Exchange.
? Centralized voucher auctions.
? Sale to insiders without tender or auction (in accordance with Article 35 of the Privatization
Act).
This Act gives preference to participation by insiders, as this allows for deferred payment (up to 10
years) when the selected buyer is a management-employee company. Moreover, this allows managers
and employees to buy up at preferential terms up to 20% of the shares of the company in which they
are employed.
In the years under consideration, the total number of transactions increased progressively, a
development that reflects the increasing commitment of the government to privatization. It is however
important to point out that in spite of the above mentioned features, the privatization process has been
uneven in terms of both contracted payments and cash revenues. The slowdown in the mid-1990s for
example, requires a twofold explanation: on the one hand, this corresponds to a change in the
administration, following the general elections of December 1994. On the other hand, whilst few cash-
based privatization transactions were concluded in that year, 1995 marked the preparation of the first
mass privatization program, which constituted an important turning point in policy, as described
earlier.
Together with the evolution of a general privatization approach, the allocation procedure for the
revenues obtained has been subject to subsequent changes. According to the 1999 and 2000 Budget
Acts, allocation of excess revenues is at the discretion of the Council of Ministers. The latter will
decide on revenues allocation ‘taking into account the execution of privatization programs and the
financial restructuring of the real and banking sectors according to the conditions of the three-year
agreement with the IMF’.9
Finally, it is important to point out that until the end of 1996, virtually all the larger state-owned
enterprises were considered ‘strategic’ and therefore not subject to privatization. At present, the long-
postponed privatization of such firms is a high priority on the government’s agenda. However, it is
difficult to foresee the overall outcome of these privatization transactions. This is because some of the
largest enterprises in this group (in terms of capital and manpower) are on the brink of bankruptcy and
likely to be privatized at ‘nominal prices’, whilst others are more profitable and expected to provide
the budget considerable revenue.
                                                       
9 However, none of the institutions we asked to share their vision (including the head of the IMF mission to
Sofia) on allocation of provisional 2000 exceeding revenues could provide reliable information.
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Fiscal objectives have rarely been referred to as a priority in the modeling and execution of Bulgaria's
privatization policy. Privatization was and still is perceived as a process of politically determined
property transfer that should entail the lowest possible social costs. Although this is not explicitly
emphasized in the government's programs, the ultimate aim of privatization is a restructuring of
former state-owned companies rather than record-breaking fiscal surpluses or a reduction of the
national debt.
However, during the transition period privatization served two important functions that directly
affected fiscal affairs – a) cash inflow into the central budget and various non-budgetary accounts and
2) reduction of the national debt through the use of government bonds as legal tender in privatization
transactions. Since the very beginning of Bulgaria's privatization process, both these functions have
been subject to strict regulation and thus fiscal objectives have been an attributing, though not
determining factor of Bulgarian privatization.
Although the allocation procedure lost some of its clarity following the 1999 amendment, public
officials from the Ministry of Finance emphasize that (from the fiscal point of view) the main aim of
privatization is currently the reduction of foreign debt. This should apply to the entire cash flow into
the central budget, since no Brady bonds have been used as payment instruments in privatization since
1997. Interestingly, in planning the fiscal year Ministry of Finance the uses two methods for planning
revenues from privatization:
?  According to the first approach, the Ministry of Finance arrives at its own estimate of how much is
needed for the current covering of foreign debt and this is duly sent to the Privatization Agency;
?  The second approach begins with the Privatization Agency, which presents a program (for which
it has three methods of preparation) before Parliament. Since 1996, these programs include the
volume of expected contractual payments and the expected cash inflow from privatization into the
consolidated budget. Following its approval, the program is submitted to the Ministry of Finance.
However, it is not clear whether the Privatization Agency considers the estimate sent by the Ministry
of Finance before presenting its own program to the Parliament.
The government's intention to use privatization to relieve the national debt burden is strengthened by
the possibility of using a variety of government bonds as payment instruments in privatization
transactions. These include two types of Brady bonds, as well as 5 types of long-term domestic debt
bonds (all of which are described in detail below). The ratio of cash payments to debt instruments, to
which privatization agents must adhere when negotiating payments, is announced annually in the
privatization programs.10 This ratio was 50:50 in 1996, since when it has been 30:70.
Thus, the major fiscal objective of privatization has gradually changed from support of different off-
budget funds, i.e. different types of public spending, to official debt reduction. The most important
events influencing this change were the following:
? In 1997, the ratio of debt instruments to cash payments, to which privatization agents must adhere
when negotiating payments, was raised from 50:50 to 70:30;
? Since 1997, every year a certain group of companies must be privatized only against cash
payments; 96% of these proceeds is used for official debt reduction;
? Since an early-1999 amendment to the Privatization Act, 90% of the cash revenues from
privatization has flowed directly into the central budget (and not to 7 non-budgetary accounts).
1.2. The Case of Poland.
The principal goal underlying Poland's privatization strategy, as declared at the very beginning of the
process, was to improve resource allocation. (Lewandowski, 1994) Other objectives of privatization
were to:
                                                       
10 Adopted with Decisions of the National Assembly.
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?  distribute property rights among the Polish population;
?  develop a Stock Exchange and capital markets through initial public offers;
?  improve the performance of enterprises by means of restructuring, leading to a more efficient use
of equity, labor and management skills;
?  reduce the size of the public sector and the burden on the public budget and administration;
?  generate revenues for the state and municipal budgets. (Lewandowski, 1994; Pater, 1995)
The Polish government has adopted a “multi-track” approach to privatization, using various methods
which it has been hoped will support the achievement of different objectives. The Act of July 13th,
1990 on the Privatization of State Enterprises constituted a compromise between a number of different
concepts. (Blaszczyk and Woodward, 1997)
The first method, called capital (or indirect) privatization, which is aimed at providing the greatest
revenues to the budget, is used for the privatization of larger state-owned enterprises. Capital
privatization consists of two stages. In the first of these, the enterprise is ‘commercialized’ or
incorporated (that is, transformed into a joint-stock or limited liability company). For the time being,
all the company’s shares remain the property of the State Treasury. In the second step, shares in the
newly established companies are made available to private investors through public offers, tenders or
negotiations following a public invitation.
The second method, referred to as liquidation (or direct) privatization, is applied to small and medium-
sized companies in relatively good financial standing. Privatization by liquidation involves transfer of
the enterprise’s assets to private investors. According to the law, there are three main options for
privatization of the whole or part of the company under this method: (1) sale of assets; (2) in-kind
contribution of the assets to the newly created company; and (3) leasing of assets to either the
company created by the management and employees of the liquidated SOE or to a third party (private
individuals only).
According to the Privatization Law of July 13th, 1990, in those cases where commercial methods were
used (referred to in Poland as capital, or indirect, privatization) employees had the right to acquire up
to 20% of their company’s shares at a preferential price (50% of the issue price). In cases of
liquidation, or direct privatization in which the leasing method was used, employees had priority over
all other bidders.
In August 1996, a new privatization law was adopted. (Blaszczyk and Woodward, 1997) The new law
grants employees a more privileged position with respect to the acquisition of shares in companies
undergoing privatization through an indirect method. Employees may acquire up to 15% of the shares
in their companies free of charge. A further 15% is available free of charge to any farmers or
fishermen that supply a given company on a permanent basis. Former employees on retirement or
disability pensions also have the right to obtain shares from this pool. The shares acquired free of
charge may not be sold for two years following acquisition and for three years in the case of
managerial employees. The law also gives the government the right to extend these periods.
As for so-called direct privatization, the new law allows ‘outsiders’ to put forward privatization
initiatives without the need to seek the approval of ‘insiders’; however, it also reduces the number of
enterprises eligible for this type of privatization by introducing very low ceilings on the size of
enterprises considered eligible.11 Additionally, while the employees of the enterprises privatized
according to this method do not receive a complimentary 15% of the shares, as in the case of capital
privatization, under the new law they may receive the equivalent thereof paid to their accounts in the
company’s social fund.
                                                       
11 Under the new law only enterprises employing up to 500 persons the annual sales of up to ECU 6 million and
own funds of up to ECU 2 million may be privatized using the direct privatization methods.
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Over the entire course of privatization in Poland, the procedure for liquidation under the State
Enterprise Law of 25 September, 1981 has also been used. This procedure is aimed at meeting the
claims of creditors of liquidated SOEs with poor financial standing and thus its fiscal effect is only
marginal.
Other privatization schemes have subsequently been added and two of these are important, although
not with regard to their direct fiscal effects: (1) the Polish model of mass privatization referred to as
the National Investment Funds (NIF) Program and (2) various types of debtor–creditor arrangements
under the Act of 3 February, 1993 on Financial Restructuring of Enterprises and Banks, allowing for
conversion of debt into equity.
The Mass Privatization Program (MPP) was developed by the Ministry of Ownership Transformation
in mid-1991. The Act on National Investment Funds (NIF), which is a modified MPP, was finally
adopted in April 1993. This law provides the legal basis for the Polish Government to establish
National Investment Funds, to contribute to those funds the shares of the former SOEs transformed
into joint stock companies, to appoint professional management for the funds and to distribute to the
Polish public share certificates, allowing them to acquire a portion of national assets represented by
their NIF shares for a price of 20 PLN (in late-1995, slightly over 7USD). It was intended that the NIF
program would accelerate the pace of privatization. Commenced in early 1995, the NIF Program has
finally reached its implementation stage. 512 enterprises were selected for the program, in which 15
NIFs were to participate. The distribution of share certificates began in November 1995 and was
completed in November 1996. According to official data, these were distributed to 25.889 million
persons, constituting the vast majority of those entitled to receive the share certificates. Of all the share
certificates distributed, as many as 98.68% have been cashed or exchanged for NIF shares. By the end
of the distribution period, the original registration fee was seven to eight times lower than the market
value of the share certificate.12
In analyzing the fiscal dimensions of Poland's privatization strategy for the 1990s, one cannot
overestimate the importance of the privatization of the banking sector. This program of privatizing
state-owned banks, separated in 1989 from the National Bank of Poland (NBP), was adopted at the
beginning of 1991. (Borowiec, 1996) According to the program, two to three commercial banks were
to be privatized each year starting in 1993, through the following share distributions:
?  30% - to domestic investors;
?  up to 20% - to the employees of the banks under privatization, under preferential terms;
?  20 to 30% - to foreign investors;
?  30% will remain in the hands of the State Treasury, including 5% for restitution claims.
The legal framework for the program's implementation was introduced in April 1992 as an amendment
to the Banking Law.
Under the Polish Privatization Law of July 13, 1990, parliament passes an annual resolution setting
out a privatization agenda (referred as “Directions of Privatization”) for the Government to follow.
Due to increasing importance of revenues from privatization for the state budget, beginning in 1993
these “Directions” were included as an appendix to the Budget Law.
From 1990 to 1997, the revenues from privatization were included in the central budget and covered
current budgetary needs13. Since that time, funds obtained from privatization began to be informally
partly separated from the central budget. This was the result of an “unwritten” agreement reached by
the Poland's main political forces in the mid 1990s. The largest political parties agreed the to the
consensus that revenues from privatization14 should not be consumed by current budgetary needs, but
                                                       
12 Informacja o Programie Narodowych Funduszy Inwestycyjnych (Information on National Investmens
Program), Ministerstwo Skarbu Panstwa, Pazdziernik  1999
13 See section on revenues in Poland
14 Especially from the big privatization programs such as privatization of the telecommunication or oil and
energy and banking sectors
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should be earmarked to cover the cost of social programs and State Treasury obligations towards
Polish citizens. Politicians realized that without that source of financing, the central budget would not
be able to cover the long-term cost of the social programs agreed upon by the political parties (pension
reform and restitution and compensation programs). On the other hand, there was no agreement
between the parties on how the programs should be designed and to what extent funds obtained from
privatization should support particular programs. For example, left-wing parties focused more on
compensation programs, almost entirely rejecting the restitution program. This was just the opposite of
the right wing parties' political preferences.
In effect, the consensus became the basis for and clearly determined the strategic goals of Poland's
privatization for the years to follow.
Before that time, the strategic goals for the privatization process have yet to be clearly formulated.
This was due to the fact that expectations connected with privatization were enormous. At the
beginning of the transformation of Poland's economy, it was presumed that the privatization process
would increase the effectiveness and competitiveness of privatized companies, assist in the formation
of a capital market, cover the budgetary deficit, help in repayment of the foreign debt and lastly, meet
social expectations through distribution of the shares of the privatized companies among Polish
citizens and the employees of the privatized companies. This meant the lack of any coherent
privatization strategy, since some of these goals were plainly contradictory and this had an adverse
effect on the speed, quality and scope of the privatization process in Poland15.
At present, one may assume that the main political forces in Poland are agreed that the main goal of
privatization in Poland is the maximization of revenues. In fact, the newly formulated privatization
strategy in Poland has allowed privatization of sectors that, since the beginning of transformation,
were practically excluded from the process by the politicians (e.g. the coal mining, energy, oil,
chemical and transportation sectors).
The “Privatization Program up to 2001”, drawn up by the Ministry of the Treasury, for the first time
ever stipulated in such a detailed manner the assignment of financial sources obtained form the
privatization process. According to this program, the financial resources needed to cover the cost of
the social and compensation programs to 2001 were estimated at 75 billion PLN. It was planned for all
these funds to be obtained from the privatization process. Table 1-1. presents the assessment of the
costs of the particular social and compensation programs included in “Privatization Program up to
2001”.
Table 1-1. Assessment of the costs of the social and compensation programs to be financed by
privatization revenues.










2. Compensation program for non-productive State sector
employees and pensioners
20.0 5.69
3. Restitution (re-privatization) program 17.0 4.83
4. Non-equivalent privatization 8.0 2.27
5. Incomes aimed at budgetary needs in 1998 6.8 1.93
6. Other programs (e.g.- restitution of trade union property
confiscated by the communist regime in 1981)
3.1 0.88
Source: “Privatization Program to 2001”, Ministry of the Treasury, 1998
                                                       
15 B. Blaszczyk “Prywatyzacja w Polsce po szesciu latach- osiagniecia, opóznienia i pozadane kierunki”, Raport
CASE nr 9, CASE, 1997
16 The average exchange rate of the National Bank of Poland as of 31st December 1997-3,5180 PLN/USD
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Of the social programs that were to be financed by funds obtained form privatization, presented in the
“Privatization Program to 2001” and that are now in the process of completion, the pension reform
was at that time the most expensive17. The main goals of Poland's pension reform were a
rationalization of the current pay-as-you go system and a partial replacement with funded elements.
The crisis in the Polish social security system became obvious to all in the 1990’s. The difficulty that
arose in assuring the financial sustainability of the system was due to the simultaneous occurrence of:
?  a sudden increase in the number of new pensioners in the beginning of the 1990’s
?  a decrease in the number of contributors as a result of declining employment
?  a marked growth in the real value of pensions compared to real compensations, due to an
indexation mechanism favoring pensioners and a broadening of the privileges for special groups of
workers
As the result, the whole system became dependent on state budget subsidies, which rose to over 6% of
GDP in 1992-1994. The prognosis for the public costs of retirement and disability benefits clearly
showed that within the framework of the “old” pension system, these expenses would increase to 22%
of GDP by the year 203518. As a result,  the introduction of a funded system was the only solution for
overburdened public finances, an aging society and the need for lifelong incomes.
The reform was implemented on January 1, 1999. According to the program, the cost of pension
reform to 2001 was estimated at 20,3 billion PLN and to 2005 at 54 billion PLN.
The second program intended to be financed through privatization incomes was the compensation
program for 2.95 million employees working in the non-productive State sector at the beginning of
the 1990s and 1.3 million pensioners. This was a result of the verdict handed down by the
Constitutional Court. In accordance with the agreement between the Government and the trade
unions,19 in 1991 and 1992 the salaries of state-owned non-productive sector employees, the financial
privileges for special working groups (e.g. soldiers) and pensions were not indexed. This was due to
the economic situation (especially fiscal position) in Poland being catastrophic at the time. Finally, the
trade unions put and their case to the Constitutional Court and won. In June 1998, the Ministry of the
Treasury estimated the cost of the program at 19 billion PLN. The program was begun in March 2000
and will be completed by 2004. Initially, it was intended for payments to be made in the form of
compensation certificates but in the end, the Government decided that payments would be made in
cash20.
The “Privatization Program up to 2001” also reserved funds for the restitution program. This
program is also to be covered by privatization revenues. The government decided to reserve17 billion
PLN to the year 2001 in order to meet restitution claims in the form of re-privatization certificates
exchangeable for State shares or stocks in privatized companies or commercialized companies. The
Government decided that the total sum of the fund set aside to meet indirect restitution claims would
reach 40 billion PLN21. Parliament has still not decided the scope and form of the restitution program.
As a result of the above, the overall cost of the program is still unknown. However, it can safely be
said that it could prove the most expensive program among all those financed by privatization
revenues. The most serious disputes concern the scope of the program. There have been more than 170
thousand restitution claims. The total value of claims presented by former owners has been estimated
at 198.4 billion PLN. According to the Ministry of the Treasury, the real value of all restitution claims
                                                       
17 On the other hand, among the social programs, the pension reform seems to be the most needed and the most
challenging one.
18 Pietka K., Petru R., “Reform of the Social Security System in Poland”, Warsaw, July 1997, CASE
19 and what is more important voted by the Parliament
20 The program is serviced by the largest, State saving bank PKO BP.
21 It concerns only the restitution claims, which wouldn’t be able to meet through the return of the property taken
away by the communist’s regime.
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amounted to 110-130 billion PLN. The Administration is forcing the scenario of a partial (50 percent)
fulfillment of restitution claims submitted by former owners, which means that the cost of the
restitution program would amount to 60-70 billion PLN. However, the unions and the associations of
former owners do not wish to agree to this compromise solution. The position of the former owners is
supported by  European Law.
It is crucial that this issue be solved before entering the EU, in order to avoid a scenario where the
central and the local budgets would be forced by European Law to meet the restitution claims in full
(such a scenario would have an unimaginably catastrophic impact on public finances).
2. EVALUATION OF STATE-OWNED ASSETS.
2.1. The Case of Bulgaria.
In early 1993, at the beginning of the privatization process in Bulgaria, the total volume of state-
owned long-term assets was estimated to be BGN 580 million (USD 345 million)22. The total volume
of state-owned assets subject to privatization is BGN 383 million (USD 228 million) or 66% of the
total assets under state ownership/control.
Prior to 2000, enterprises in infrastructure sectors (energy, transportation, water supply and sewerage
systems) were excluded from the scope of privatization. It is estimated that about 30% of long-term
tangible assets are held by infrastructure companies that for the time being are not subject to
privatization or would prove difficult to privatize, such as the National Electric Company, Bulgarian
State Railways, forests, ports, etc. According to the Program for the Privatization of State-owned
Companies in 2000, some of these infrastructure enterprises are scheduled for privatization23.
There are basically two approaches to measuring privatization of state-owned assets in Bulgaria. The
first one is the methodology applied by the Word Bank, according to which a company or the assets of
a given enterprise are considered privatized when 67% of its shares are transferred from public to
private ownership24. The methodology of the Privatization Agency considers the company and its
assets privatized when 51% of shares are in private hands.
Between 1992 and June 30, 1995, just 2.6% of total state-owned assets were transferred to private
hands. By mid-1995, the total volume of state ownership in 3,510 enterprises, in terms of fixed assets,
amounted to BGN 564 million. This accounts for up to 64% of the 199525 GDP.
A significant acceleration in almost all forms of privatization can be observed in late-1996 and 1997.
In 1996, the voucher privatization scheme was launched. Preparation for the first wave began in 1995,
but was only completed between the end of 1996 and the beginning of 1997. According to the
Government Program for Mass Privatization, stakes varying between 10 and 90% of shares in 1,050
state-owned enterprises were included in a list of companies to be privatized through the voucher
system. 10% of every stake offered was to be transferred free to the company’s workers and managers;
                                                       
22 The book value of the state-owned assets is as of 31 December 1995. Due to the galloping inflation in 1996 –
1997 and the brief hyperinflation period in early-1997, the figures were re-estimated in late-1997.
23 For example, such infrastructure companies scheduled for privatization are: companies for production and
distribution of electric power (hydro-electric power stations, thermo-electric power stations, regional companies
for electric power distribution,etc.), coal-mining enterprises, detached manufacturing units of  Bulgarian State
Railways, etc.
24 Following Bulgarian Trade Law, which proclaims that 67 % are needed for full control over a company.
25 At current prices.
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the remaining 90% was to be offered to the public through centralized public auctions26. As a result of
this process, some 85 million shares were offered to the public, of which over 80% were sold.
However, the relative impact of mass privatization on the disposal of state-owned assets is considered
to be limited. With regard to the relative effect of the first wave of mass privatization on the total value
of long-term assets owned by the state, available sources provide somewhat contrasting figures: some
indicate a relative impact of 7 – 9%, while others report a slightly higher percentage of 11 – 13%. In
all cases, the official figures27 on the total impact of mass privatization, including minority stakes,
indicate 14.6% of the total volume of state’s assets.
Table 2-1. The Privatization Agency's Figures for State-owned Long-term Assets at the beginning of
1999 (book value as of December 31, 1998)28
Majority stakes Long-term assets
(million BGN)
as of 31.12.1995
% of the total volume
of state-owned assets
(BGN 580 million)
1. Cash privatization 163 55.218 9.54
2. Via intermediaries 126 103.886 17.9
2.1. Pools 73 15.167 2.6
2.2. SARA Pool 26 1.699 0.3
2.3. Consultants 27 87.020 15
3. For liquidation 19 3.263 0.6
Total 308 162.367 28
Source: Privatization Agency
Indeed, 1999 saw the most significant progress in privatization since the beginning of the process.
1,225 transactions were completed, a record compared to previous years. The volume of de-
nationalized assets in 1998 was about BGN 79.14 million, which is 13.63% of the total assets subject
to privatization. 11.46% of them were sold by the Privatization Agency, 0.96% by Ministry of Trade
and Tourism, 0.37% by the Ministry of Industry and 0.33% by the Ministry of Regional Development
and Public Works.
Table2-2. The (%) share of state-owned assets privatized by years




0.56 2.47 1.62 6.19 27.81 6.80 25.79 71.24
Total state-
owned assets
0.37 1.63 1.07 4.09 18.36 4.49 17.03 47.04
Source: Privatization Agency
The overall result of both cash and mass privatization in terms of long-term assets sold from the
beginning of the process until the end of 1999 differs according to the two methods of measuring
privatization of state-owned assets:
According to the estimates using World Bank methodology, the total volume of long-term tangible
assets privatized over the period is BGN 184 million, i.e. 31.7% of the total volume of state-owned
assets and 48% of the assets subject to privatization (BGN 383 m). These results are quite different
from those of the Privatization Agency.
According to the Privatization Agency, the assets privatized to the end of 1999 amount to BGN 268
million, which is significantly higher than the World Bank estimate. If we accept these figures, the
                                                       
26 Three separate bidding sessions took place in late-1996 and early-1997.
27 A report on the Result of the Program to privatize State-owned Enterprises in 1999.
28 Excluding 39 enterprises, which are difficult for privatization. Their long-term assets amount up to BGN 205
million, or to 35.43 % of the total state-owned assets.
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relative value of privatization against the total value of the long-term assets is 47%. Respectively, the
share of already privatized assets in the total assets subject to privatization is 71%.
2.2. The case of Poland.
The Ministry of Ownership Transformation conducted the first official assessment of the value of
State property in 1995 (and at the same estimated the potential revenues to be obtained from
privatization). As of 31st December 1994, the book value of the stocks and shares of State Owned
Enterprises, State financial institutions, commercialized State Enterprises and companies with partial
State Treasury29 participation was estimated at 75 billion PLN or 30.8 billion USD (see Table 2-2).
However, this estimate was not comprehensive as it covered only the productive sector30. It also did
not take into consideration potential income from the sale of municipal property (this aspect is
especially important when analyzing restitution claims).








- equity 34.9 14.3
- 2/3 of profits 1.6 0.7
Commercialized State Enterprises
- equity 21.3 8.7
- 2/3 of profits 2.3 0.9
Financial Institutions (11 banks and 3 insurance companies)
- equity 9.6 3.9
- 2/3 of profit 0.7 0.3
Market value of stocks owned by the State Treasury and listed
on the Warsaw Stock Exchange 1.8 0.7
Companies with partial State Treasury participation 1.3 0.5
25% of the value of the companies included in the MPP program 1.5 0.6
TOTAL 75 30.8
Source: “Directions for Privatization of State Property in 1995”, Council of Ministers, Warsaw, 1996.
Following the parliamentary election won by the Action for Solidarity Election (Akcja Wyborcza
Solidarnosc) and the Union of Freedom (Unia Wolnosci) parties in September 1997, a much more
comprehensive and detailed estimate of state-owned property was carried out by the Ministry of State
Treasury. This study included not only the value of the State's productive sector but also assessed the
value of the State sector's non-productive property (e.g. lands and forests, buildings and facilities of
State administration and State organizational units and the property of higher education institutions).
These estimates were included in the “Privatization Program up to 2001” prepared by the new
Government. The Council of Ministers adopted the program on 14th July 1998. It should be
emphasized that the program presented not only a schedule for the privatization activities of the new
government and an assessment of the value of State property, but also allocated the revenues obtained
from privatization. In fact, it was the first official government document to balance potential revenues
                                                       
29 In that case only the value of the stocks and shares in the hands of the State Treasury was taken into
consideration.
30 Productive sector includes also the financial sector.
31 The average exchange rate of the National Bank of Poland as of 31st December 1994- 2,3173 PLN/USD
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from privatization of State property with the potential cost of the social and compensation programs to
be financed from the same.
According to the program, as of 31st December 1997, the value of State property (not including the
value of natural resources and national cultural property) amounted to 604.3 billion PLN (almost 172
billion USD32- see Table 2-4). Comparing the value of the State's productive sector estimated by the
Ministry of Ownership Transformation in 1995 with the figure estimated by the State Treasury in the
Program, we may observe an enormous difference. The estimated value of the State's productive sector
as of 31st December 1997 was twice as high as the estimate made in 1995 (respectively 15033 and 75
billion PLN). Analyzing the values of State property as estimated in 1995 and 1998, the clear
conclusion must be drawn that any comprehensive estimate of State property values should be treated
with caution and a wide margin should be left for errors and omissions.
Table 2-4 Value of State property as of 31st of December 1997.





1 Lands and forests 117.8 33.5
2 River routes, canals and dams 287.2 81.6
3 Buildings and facilities of state administration and state
organizational units
41.4 11.8
4 Stocks and shares of the State Treasury 81.7 23.2
5 Property of state agencies 19.3 5.5
6 Property of state-owned enterprises35 50.1 14.2
7
Property of higher education institutions
3.7 1.1
8 Other 3.1 0.9
9 TOTAL (1-8) 604.3 171.8
Source: “Privatization Program to 2001”, Ministry of the Treasury, 1998
In its “Privatization Program up to 2001”, the Ministry of the Treasury “reserved” the following
components of State property to cover the cost of the compensation and restitution and social
programs to be financed by privatization revenues:
- stocks and shares of the State Treasury 81.7 billion PLN
- property of state-owned enterprises 50.0 billion PLN
- property of the State Treasury that can be transferred
  within the restitution scheme 31.2 billion PLN
- municipal property that can be transferred within the
  restitution scheme 69.7 billion PLN
                                                       
32 The average exchange rate of the National Bank of Poland as of 31st December 1997- 3,5180 PLN/USD
33 Into a productive sector I included shares and stocks belonged to the State Treasury, the property of State
Agencies, the property of State Owned Enterprises.
34 The average exchange rate of the National Bank of Poland as of 31st December 1997-3,5180 PLN/USD
35 The value of the State Owned Enterprises (SOE) was estimated on the base of the net assets value of the SOE
(assets minus liabilities)
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The total value of State property earmarked to cover the cost of the compensation and restitution and
social programs was estimated by the Ministry of the Treasury in the “Privatization Program to 2001”
at 232,6 billion PLN.
Many economists express the opinion that the forecasted value of State property presented in the
“Privatization Program to 2001” was extremely optimistic. There are several arguments backing this
view. Among these the most important are the following:
- According to the Central Statistics Office, many of the companies that are to be used as
“collateral” for the restitution claims are permanent loss-making enterprises that will have
to be sold at a price below their book value (some of these enterprises will even have a
negative market value - e.g. companies that will be liquidated or enter bankruptcy
procedures),
- In view of past and present experience in the field of ownership transformation as well as
the quality of the State portfolio (the financial and competitive position of the companies
to be privatized), one cannot be certain that these enterprises will be privatized even
within the next ten years,
- Some enterprises considered by the “Privatization Program to 2001” as a source of
potential privatization revenues have already been excluded from the privatization process
(“Lasy panstwowe” can be used as an example, the value of the enterprise being estimated
at 12 billion PLN).
- Municipal authorities will block any attempts to use their property as a means of meeting
restitution claims, especially where the property is already used as collateral for credit or
bonds.
To summarize, it would seem that the potential incomes to be obtained from privatization of State
property as presented in the “Privatization Program up to 2001” were overvalued. The State Treasury
will probably never obtain such large revenues from any form of privatization process (or through the
return of assets to former owners).
3. DYNAMICS OF FISCAL EFFECTS OF PRIVATIZATION.
3.1. The Case of Bulgaria.
In analyzing the fiscal dimensions of privatization, we may distinguish three important categories of
the financial effects of privatization. The first is the volume of payments contracted by the central
privatization bodies, including cash and other means of payment. The second is the volume of actual
payments in privatization transactions. Finally, we have cash proceeds from privatization, which
represent only the flow of money into the central budget and various non-budgetary accounts. In this
section, emphasis falls on cash proceeds from privatization.
For the period 1993 – 1999, the total volume of cash proceeds from privatization amounts to
approximately USD 1 billion36. Privatization revenues have registered a continual increase since 1993
                                                       
36 Estimated through the yearly average BGN/USD exchange rates.
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(with the exception of 1997, when only three transactions brought revenue of more than USD 280
million) along with an increase in the number of transactions and volume of assets privatized.
Privatization proceeds were only 0.1% of GDP in the first year of the process, but reached 3.21% in
1997. In the graph below, the expected privatization of the Bulgarian Telecommunications Company
is included in the forecast for 200037. If this indeed takes place, the cash proceeds from privatization
for that year will be over 7.3% of GDP.
Figure 3-1.
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%
Source: Ministry of Finance, National Statistics Institute
Privatization’s contribution to consolidated budget revenues became relatively significant after 1995,
when it reached 1.2% of budget revenues. The contribution was highest in 1997 – 9.9% – and is
expected to be approximately 18% in the year 2000.
The payments contracted by the central privatization bodies have significantly exceeded cash
proceeds. In the graph below, both are represented in USD in order to eliminate the effects of domestic
currency depreciation. On average, cash proceeds were 41% of contractual payments. The main
reasons for this were:
? extensive use of debt instruments as legal tender in privatization;
? the deferred payment schemes (up to 10 years) used  in MEBOs;
? the rapid depreciation of the domestic currency, in which most of the contracts before 1998 (i.e.
years of galloping and hyperinflation) were signed.
Table 3-1. Contractual Payments vs. Cash Proceeds in Bulgarian Privatization (million USD)
Year 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
Payments
contracted
44 144 114 185 572 585 646 2.168
Cash proceeds 11 21 59 85 325 201 283 847
Source: Privatization Agency, Ministry of Finance
                                                       
37 It is most likely that BTC will be privatized in 2000 for the government has undertaken such commitment
before the International Monetary Fund. The one and only offer so far was submitted by the Greek-Dutch
consortium OTE/KPN, which proposed a price of USD 700 million. The price is to be paid entirely cash.
22
Figure 3-2.
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SD Actual contractual payments (m USD)
Cash revenues (m USD)
Source: Privatization Agency, Ministry of Finance
Since 1998, the annual programs of the Privatization Agency have included projected contractual
payments. In both years, the actual payments contracted significantly exceeded the plan. Even in the
program for the year 2000, only 663 contractual payments are envisaged although USD 700 million is
being offered for BTC alone. A possible explanation for this mismatch is the government's fear of
huge budget deficits due to planned but unrealized privatization proceeds. However, it is the cash
proceeds that directly affect the budget rather than the contractual payments, which remain in the
programs.
Table 3-2:  Planned and Actual Contractual payments




2000 663 2 168
Source: Privatization Agency
In the majority of contractual payments, the largest share was held by the Privatization Agency, as it
was responsible for the sale of the largest (in terms of long-term tangible assets) enterprises. The
remaining central privatization agents altogether contracted 46% of the revenues.
Table 3-3 Contribution by Various Privatization Bodies to payments contracted (1993 – 1999)
Body Share (%)*
Privatization Agency 53.8
Ministry of Economy** 27.6
Ministry of Regional Development and Welfare 8.4
Ministry of Agriculture and Forests 6.1
Ministry of Transport and Communications 3.9
Ministry of Health 0.6
Ministry of Culture 0.1
Ministry of Education and Science 0.02
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Energy and Energy Resources State Agency 0.1
Total 100.0
Note: * Share of revenues in current year in BGN.
** Before late-1999 the Ministry of Economy was two bodies: the Ministry of Industry and
the Ministry of Trade and Tourism.
Source: Privatization Agency
The privatizing agents contracted these payments using several types of payment instruments,
including cash, government securities, vouchers and compensatory bonds (issued against restitution
claims). The table below represents the share of different payment instruments in the total contractual
payments for state-owned companies. The table shows that 30.6% of the payments were negotiated in
government bonds. Meanwhile, the total volume of government bonds actually used as legal tender in
privatization amounts to approximately USD 413 million, i.e. about 29% of actual payments
(including cash and debt instruments). Equity-debt swaps are described separately.
Table 3-4.  Share of Means of Payment in Payments Contracted (1993 – 1999)





Other means of payment 1.3
Total 100.0
* Share of revenues in the current year in BGN.
Source: Privatization Agency
Concentration on revenues by source has been significant, since almost 44% of the cash proceeds from
privatization have so far come from the top five transactions (table below). Over the years, the major
providers of privatization revenues have been the chemical, food, brewery and tourism industries.
Table3-5  The Five Largest Privatization Deals
Company Sector Price (million
USD)
Purchased by
Sodi – Devnya Chemical industry 160 Solvay
Neftochim - Burgas Chemical industry 101 Lucoil Petrol
MDK – Pirdop Copper production   80 Union Miniere Group
Petrol – Sofia Chemical industry   52 Yucos Petroleum, Petrol
Holding and OMV
Devnya Cement Cement production   45 Marvex
Total 438
Source: Privatization Agency
Foreign investors purchased all the companies listed in the Table 3-5 above. Altogether, the
Privatization Agency contracted 88 transactions with foreign investors. The contractual revenues from
these amounted to approximately USD 825 million, i.e. 36% of the payments contracted by all central
privatization bodies38. Meanwhile, the volume of foreign direct investments through privatization
                                                       
38 In this percentage only the PA’s transactions with foreign investors are included due to the limited availability
of data of the other privatizing bodies’ activity.
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(including direct payments and liabilities of privatized companies undertaken) was USD 1.14 billion
for the period 1993 – 1999, i.e. 42% of the total FDI volume for the period.
3.2. The Case of Poland.
Revenues according to privatization method
In the table below, privatization revenues have been divided into four methods (paths) as in the
"Reports on achievement of the State Budget" prepared by the Ministry of Finance. Thus we may see
that capital privatization has been divided into two parts: one for enterprises and one for banks.
However, it must be remembered that privatization of banks should in practice be treated as part of
indirect privatization. On the other hand, in the table below "direct privatization" means both: ordinary
direct privatization of small enterprises in good economic condition, but also the liquidation of
bankrupt firms.
Table 3-6. shows the very high annual growth rate of real privatization revenues each year. The
biggest increase was recorded at the beginning of the process and this may be interpreted as a sign that
the fiscal side of privatization has been extremely successful since the very beginning of the process.
One may also claim that this is a poor statistical effect, i.e. the result of a very low base. The last sharp
increase, in 1999, is the result of implementing privatization in the largest state banks and such
companies as PKO S.A., Poland's second largest bank, and T.P. S.A. – the national
telecommunications operator.
Table3-6.   State budget revenues from various privatization methods according to State Budget
Realization Reports
In millions of PLN
Year 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999
Total privatization revenues 170.94 484.44 780.36 1594.86 2641.58 3749.80 6537.70 8325.95 13347.5
Revenues in millions of USD 161,26 356,21 431,14 702.58 1091.56 1393.98 1993.2 2385.66 3364.21
dynamics, previous year = 100 (in
real terms)
198.2 119.1 154.6 129.6 118.4 151.7 113.9 149,4
Indirect (Capital) Privatization - 309.40 439.38 846.80 1714.20 1945.30 3254.10 6620.00 12949.7
Share of Indirect in total - 63.9% 56.3% 53.1% 64.9% 51.9% 49.8% 79.5% 97.0%
previous year = 100 (in real terms) 105.0 145.8 158.4 94.6 145.6 182.0 182.3
Direct Privatization - - 287.03 322.90 406.10 973.40 359.10 429.40 388.7
Share of Direct in total - - 36.8% 20.2% 15.4% 26.0% 5.5% 5.2% 2,9%
previous year = 100 (in real terms) 85.1 98.4 199.9 32.1 107.0 84,4
Privatization of Banks (capital
only)
- - 53.96 425.20 521.30 831.10 2924.50 1276.55 N/A
Share of Banks in Total - - 6.9% 26.7% 19.7% 22.2% 44.7% 15.3% N/A
previous year = 100 (in real terms) 596.1 95.9 133.0 306.3 39.0 N/A
Source: Report on achievement of the State Budget for the years 1991-1998, Ministry of State
Treasury (data for 1999), Central Statistics Office (inflation) , IFS-IMF, Own Calculations
NOTE: the data for indirect privatization in 1999 also covers the privatization of banks.
As the above table indicates, revenues from indirect privatization are the most important from the
budgetary point of view and this share is increasing almost every year. In 1999, the total share of
indirect privatization, enterprises plus banks, in total revenues reached 97%.
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Revenues from indirect privatization are also characterized by the most regular real annual growth
rate. The sharp increase in indirect privatization revenues in 1996 can be explained by the amendment
of the privatization law enacted in the middle of that year. One may presume that numerous previously
begun privatization processes were accelerated in order for them to be completed before the new law
came into force. It may also be true that other ministries (other then MST) tried to privatize as much as
possible before all state enterprises were “transferred” to voivodship authorities and the Privatization
Agency, which in fact is constitutes a department of the MST. This transfer took place in the
beginning of 1997, due to a reform of the central government administration. This observation is
additionally confirmed by the data on indirect privatization originating in MST, showing that no sharp
increase occurred in that particular year.
Figure 3-1.also shows the real increase of annual privatization revenues from the beginning of the
process. In 1999,  official privatization revenues were in real terms more than 10-fold greater than at
the beginning of the process (1991).
Figure 3-2.
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dynamics, 1991=100; real terms 100.00 198.2 235.9 364.8 472.7 559.7 849.3 967.4 1445.4
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Source: As in Table 3-6.
In discussing revenues from privatization, one must not forget the mass privatization program (NIF-
National Investment Funds program) conducted in the years 1995-1997. Obviously, fiscal revenue was
not the main objective of this privatization path and it will be considered in more detail when we come
to discuss the costs of this process. However, as will be explained later, we do not consider this
process privatization as such and therefore do not include either the revenues or costs related to this
program as a direct fiscal effect of privatization.
The selling of NIF “share certificates” began in November 1995 and was practically completed by
November 1996. The total number of certificates sold reached 25,889,334. Since every certificate was
sold for 20 PLZ, this provided revenue equal to 517.79 million PLZ during one year, of which
approximately 350 million has been transferred to the budget. Therefore this revenue is comparable to
the revenues from privatization of banks in 1995, or to one of the largest privatization contracts carried
out in 1996 (ZPT Kraków).
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Major revenue providers
Table in Annex No 1. presents the level of concentration of privatization revenues in terms of the
major revenue providers. As may be seen, the share of the largest privatization contracts in total
privatization revenues tends to increase, especially over the last three years, i.e. 1997-1999. Figure 3-
3. provides a very clear illustration of this process. This increase is closely linked to the growing
importance of indirect privatization in total revenues, since all larger privatization contracts are
performed using this path, either by a public offer on the stock market or by selling to strategic
(mainly foreign) investors. The mixed path is also applied, as in the case of the PKO SA bank or T.P.
S.A. If we consider the enormous privatization plans for the year 2000, we may also expect the role
played by large individual privatization contracts to increase in the future.
Figure 3-3.











3 as a percentage of total privatization revenues
3 as a percentage of total privatization revenues 18.1% 42.9% 28.1% 29.2% 61.5% 58.0% 71.5%
1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999
The greatest number of large privatization transactions has been performed in the banking sector (6),
followed by the tobacco industry (4) and the cement and pharmaceutical industries (3). Obviously, this
branch structure does not reflect the structure of the entire privatization process. The greatest number
of privatized companies belongs to the food, machinery and construction sectors and this seems to
mirror the structure of industry as a whole as it was inherited from the socialist economy (as far as the
number of companies is concerned and excluding coal mines, steel mills and other branches that have
been excluded from privatization due to their “strategic” nature).
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The growing concentration of privatization revenues presented in Table in the Annex No. 1. leads us to
look more cautiously at the figures presenting a sharp increase in privatization revenues. It means that
last year's privatization revenues were almost totally determined by enormous individual transactions.
Obviously, the number of large state-owned companies, such as the largest banks, the national
telecommunications operator or the national airline is strictly limited. Therefore one cannot expect this
sharp increase in privatization revenues to last forever; eventually these revenues will begin to fall as
sharply as they have been increasing. The above observation may seem trivial, but it is particularly
important from the macroeconomic policy point of view.
Cash revenues and other financial obligations according to various privatization methods39
The total share of obligations in privatization revenues is decreasing. This may be most easily observed
in the case of indirect privatization, which in an obvious way drives the total number of revenues.
Table 3-7. The share of other financial obligations in the total privatization revenues contracted in the
years 1991-1997
1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997
Indirect privatization 20.2% 14.9% 14.8% 11.0% 5.1% 1.3% 0.4%
Direct privatization since '90 30.6% 33.3% 24.1% 19.1% 19.2% 69.4%
Total since '90 20.7% 23.8% 14.2% 7.6% 4.7% 6.2%
No data is presently available for the years 1998-99
Source: MST and CSO
The situation looks a little different in the case of direct privatization, where a large number of the
privatized companies have been leased to insiders. About 80% of budget incomes from direct
privatization for the years 1994-1997 came from this method. According to the Central Statistics Office,
the share of obligations in leasing contracts increased in 1997 from about 17-25% (for the three previous
years) to more the 77% of all contracted revenues. This increase explains the sharp growth of obligations
in total direct privatization revenues in that year.
Ratio of effective revenues to those planned in government programs
Table 3-8. shows that for the last 6 years, the government has regularly underestimated privatization
revenues in any given fiscal year. The graph clearly illustrates both the direction and the size of this error.
This time, budget plans were nearly half the effective revenues, which sets a new record. The regular
underestimation of revenues may suggest that privatization was being treated as a hidden source of
budget reserves.
Table 3-9. Government privatization revenues programs and revenues obtained according to privatization
method in the years 1991-1999
Millions of PLN 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999
Total planned priv. Revenues 380 600 880 1230 2330 2165 4450 6700 6900
Obtained 170 484 780 1595 2642 3750 6538 8326 13347
Revenues obtained as a
percentage of those planned












Planned indirect priv. - 400.00 450.00 450.00 1516.0 1800.0 2510.0 6251.1 NA
                                                       
39 The data for this  part come from the CSO and as already mentioned earlier can not be treated as complete and
therefore one should take them as estimates only.
28
Revenues 0 0 0 8









Revenues obtained as a
percentage of those planned











Planned direct priv. Revenues - - 380.00 350.00 370.00 365.00 490.00 451.52 NA
Obtained - - 287.03 322.90 406.10 973.40 359.10 429.40 NA
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Source: Reports on achievement of the state budget for the years 1991-1998, own calculations.
This could be especially true for the years before 1997. Since then, privatization has not been a part of
budget revenues but is counted as an additional source of government income which, according to the
“Report on achievement of the state budget for 1998” was used to finance the budget deficit and therefore
can no longer be a tool for decreasing the official budget deficit. This would seem to be a reasonable
policy. Treating privatization as part of budget revenues could be very dangerous, since it might lead to
some form of hidden budget deficit that could explode when this kind of revenue eventually ceases40.
Taking into account both its importance for total privatization revenues and also the size of any
“mistake”, it seems that bank privatization is the main cause for concern, when it comes to
underestimating revenues. This seems especially strange, since privatization of any bank is normally
planned a long way ahead of time and therefore revenues should also be relatively easy to plan. However,
one must also remember that the final price obtained for a privatized bank (or other company) at the
moment of privatization is very much dependent on the current situation of the financial markets and
therefore to some extent, any poor prediction may be justified.
The serious error concerning indirect privatization in 1996 seems to have been mainly caused by the
appearance of really large individual privatization contracts, for example STALEXPORT, which was
sold for more than 190 million PLN. The significant error concerning direct privatization in 1996 was
probably caused by the amendments to the privatization law referred to earlier in this text.
Figure 3-4.
                                                       
40 The issue of the use of privatization revenues is treated in more detail in chapter.... of this report.
29

















Source: as in Table 3-7.
Privatization revenues as a share of GDP and as a share of the central budget
As may be expected, both the share of privatization revenues in total budget revenues and their share in
GDP rises each year. Figure 3-4. illustrates this very clearly. A similar graph for the share in GDP would
be almost identical, since the share of budget revenues in GDP has remained more or less at the same
level - 25-30% for the last 9 years. In 1998, privatization revenues per capita were 61.70 USD and per
person gainfully employed 146.66 USD. The meaning of these figures may be better understood if we
consider that GDP per capita and per person gainfully employed in this particular year amounted to
4119.08 USD and 9791.62 USD respectively.
Table 3-10. Privatization revenues as a share of the central budget and as a share of GDP
Millions of PLN 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999
Total privatization revenues 170.94 484.44 780.36 1594.86 2641.58 3749.80 6537.70 8325.95 13347.50
Total central budget revenues
(including privatization)
21088 31277 45900 63125 83721 99674 126309 134885 125911.5
Privatization as a percentage of
budget revenues
0.81 1.55 1.70 2.53 3.16 3.76 5.18 6.17 10.60
Privatization as a percentage of
budget revenues (for the period
1997-1999 increased by
privatization revenues)
0.81 1.55 1.70 2.53 3.16 3.76 4.92 5.81 9.58
Central budget deficit / GDP (%) 3.8 6.0 2.8 2.7 2.4 2.4 1.3 2.4 2.05
Privatization as a percentage of
GDP (%)
0.21 0.42 0.50 0.76 0.86 0.97 1.39 1.51 2.18
Net budget result */ GDP (%) - 3.8 -  6.0 - 2.8 - 2.7 - 2.4 - 2.4 0.1 - 0.9 - 0.1
* Central budget deficit plus privatization revenues
Source: Reports on Achievement of the State Budget for the years 1991-1999, Central Statistics Office-
for GDP and own calculations.
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Comparing the figures in Table 3-8., one must remember that till 1996, privatization revenues were
counted as an ordinary budget income, i.e. the officially reported budget deficits in those years were
deficits after privatization had been included. Since 1997 they have been calculated separately. Therefore,
in order to ensure comparability, in the Table 3-8. the last row (net budget result / GDP) shows the actual
budget deficit/surplus after privatization revenues have been included in central budget revenues. In this
way, the net budget result for the period 1991 – 1996 is equal to the central budget deficit. However, in
the years 1997 – 1999, the net budget result is a lesser negative figure (in 1997, even a positive one) than
the budget deficit.
Figure 3-5.
Source: As Table 3-10.
Revenues from foreign investors
The share of foreign investors in total privatization revenues seems to be declining.
Due to a lack of domestic capital and also underdevelopment of the Stock Exchange, at the beginning of
the privatization process sales to foreign strategic investors was the best and indeed the only possible way
of privatizing larger enterprises.
Table 3-11. Revenues from foreign strategic investors (FSI) as a share of total privatization revenues,
indirect privatization and in total FDI in the years 1991-1998
Millions of PLZ 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998
FSI 134.6 290.9 319.4 236.20 1163.1 1139.2 1522.1 1042.4
FSI/total revenues 78.7% 60.0% 40.9% 14.8% 44.0% 30.4% 23.3% 12.5%
FSI/indirect privatization 94.0% 72.7% 27.9% 67.9% 58.6% 46.8% 15.7%
FSI/FDI 5.5% 13.1% 9.4% 9.5% 4.7%








1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999
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Source: Report on the change of ownership structure in 1998. MST-1999, National Bank of Poland  and
own calculations.
The situation eventually changed in 1994, when Bank Slaski was partially privatized through a public
offer on the Stock Exchange. In 1998, the two largest privatization transactions were performed through
the Stock Exchange and this sharply reduced the importance of foreign investors in that year. Obviously,
this does not mean no part of the shares of those companies were purchased by foreigners on the Stock
Exchange. Nevertheless, it is not to be treated as the sale of a privatized company to a foreign strategic
investor.
However, it seems that in 1999 the situation had changed. Shares of both the banks privatized in that year
were sold to foreign direct investors. Hence the first impression one draws from Table 3-11 may be a
little misleading. The largest privatization contracts planned for 2000, for example T.P. SA and Bank
Handlowy SA are also to be concluded by selling part of their shares to foreign investors. Thus it seems
that the sharp fall observed in 1998 was only a one year anomaly.
The data concerning the percentage share of privatization transactions in total FDI also fails to indicate
any well-defined pattern. In fact, it is quite closely correlated with the percentage share of foreign
investment in total privatization revenues. It seems that this share is quite randomly determined by the
occasional large privatization contracts with foreign investors in the given year. For example, in 1995
(the year with the highest share) most of the five largest privatization contracts were concluded with the
participation of a foreign investor (about 70% of the value of shares sold), whereas in 1998 (the minimum
share) only 19% of the shares of the five largest contracts were sold to foreign investors. It is expected
that in 2000, the share of privatization transactions in total FDI will again rise, for the same reasons as
referred to in the previous paragraph.
Various payment instruments
The role of payment instruments other then cash would not seem to be an important factor in
privatization revenues in Poland. At the beginning of the privatization process, some direct privatization
payments were carried out by treasury obligations. The share of these kind of payments decreased very
rapidly. In 1991 it was 19%, in 1992 - 2,7% and finally in 1993 – 1,5%, after which the Central Statistics
Office ceased to report any transactions of this kind.
In the case of direct privatization, part of the assets of privatized companies are either contributed in kind
to the company or, especially in cases of liquidation, may serve to pay off the creditors of a bankrupt
company. According to the Central Statistics Office, the total share of assets contributed in kind in the
years 1990- (first half of) 1999 equaled 8.4% of the assets distributed by the direct privatization method
and payments to creditors constituted 50.1% of the assets of companies liquidated during the period.
One must however take into account that these kind of transactions are not registered as privatization
revenues and therefore do not affect our earlier statistics.
The other issue to be examined in this section is ownership transformation under the “Law on Financial
Restructuring...” that was enacted in February 1993. Although some may consider the ownership
transformations that have been conducted to be a form of privatization, this is not strictly correct. This
law was developed and introduced mainly for state-owned banks and enterprises, to enable them to
resolve mutual arrears problems. Therefore, even if under this law some assets of state enterprises were
seized by banks or other companies, this should not be treated as privatization, since at least during the
first few years, most of those banks and companies were likewise state-owned.
Obviously, this situation has gradually changed. Nevertheless, any change in ownership structure has
always been a by-product of transactions conducted according to this law.
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3.3. Comparison
Comparing the dynamics of privatization proceeds in Bulgaria and Poland one have to take into
consideration various starting points for privatization process in both countries. Privatization in Bulgaria
begun in practice three years later than in Poland. From this point of view comparison of the dynamics
reveals interesting coincidence: in both countries privatization revenues achieved share close to 1% of
GDP in this same year namely in 1996, which was third year of the initiation of the process in Bulgaria,
and sixth in case of Poland. In both countries the revenues tends to rise systematically year by year.
Comparison does not prove the hypothesis relating trade-of between budgetary incomes from
privatization and speed of privatization.41
Figure 3-6.
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Source: As in the Figure 3-1. and the Table 3-10.
Especially relatively significant became privatization’s contribution to the countries’ budgets revenues in
late nineties: it reached 9.9% of budget revenues for Bulgaria (in 1997) and  for Poland 9.58% (in 1999).
Comparison of revenues from privatization in Bulgaria and Poland in absolute terms reflects rather the relative size
of both economics, therefore can give only very general picture of the proportion of the privatization proceeds for
each country.
Figure 3-7.
                                                       
41 This interdependency has been formulated by B. Blaszczyk and R. Woodward and was probably valid for the first
stage of privatization. (Blaszczyk and Woodward, (1996), p. 17)
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Source: …  , Privatization Agency (Bulgaria)
Figure 3-8.
Comparison of the level of concentration of the privatization revenues for Bulgaria and Poland in terms
of biggest providers shows more differences than similarities. Relatively high concentration for Bulgaria
in the first two years of the process could be explained by very low absolute size of the privatization
proceeds and small number of privatization deals for this period. Growing and very high concentration in
Poland for the last three years is caused by privatization of large companies and banks. Privatization
revenues were almost totally determined by very few enormous individual transactions.
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4. DEBT-EQUITY SWAPS IN THE BULGARIAN APPROACH TO PRIVATIZATION
4.1. Brady Bonds as a payment instrument in privatization
The end of 1994 completed most of the measures for reducing Bulgaria’s foreign debt and servicing the
same by concluding Brady Bond transactions with the London Club creditors. Meanwhile, the bad loans
of the pre-transition period, accumulated by state enterprises in state banks, were transformed into official
domestic debt. As a result, by the end of 1994 Bulgaria faced a substantial domestic debt of BGN 273.7
million (USD 5.05 billion) and foreign debt amounting USD 10.3 billion. The domestic debt consisted
largely – 57.2% or BGN 156.6 million (USD 2.89 billion) of government bonds issued to transform the
debts of state-owned companies into official debt. At the same time, the largest share of foreign debt was
in Brady Bonds – 50.1% or USD 5.1 billion.
During the same year, steps were taken towards alleviating the country's debt burden and simultaneously
stimulating the privatization process. These measures involved introducing regulations to govern debt
conversion. They were part of the government's general market adjustment strategy aimed at sustainable
growth through private sector development and investment stimulation.
The main feature of all the regulations introduced to deal with the legal, institutional and procedural
aspects of the debt-equity swap mechanism was debt annulment by converting government debt in state
assets. Naturally, concluding such transactions, swapping debt against property, largely depends on the
attractiveness, liquidity and quality of assets to be invested in. Another concern is the careful selection of
debt instruments, based on the country’s strategic goals for government debt reduction and mid-term
fiscal stabilization.
At first, two major types of government bonds for converting debt to property were introduced:
? government domestic debt bonds, issued under the provisions of the Law on the Settlement of Non-
Performing Credits Negotiated Before 31 December 199042 (These bonds are called ZUNKs, a
Bulgarian abbreviation of the Law.)
? Brady Bonds, issued under an Agreement with the London Club since March 1994.
The Privatization Act stipulates that government debt creditors may participate in the privatization
process with their claims by following the procedures set by the Council of Ministers and which
determine the CM’s legal activity in this area. It also regulates all activities related to conversion of debt
to property for each specific debt instrument.
The conditions and procedures for participating in privatization through foreign debt government bonds
have been regulated by two successive ordinances of the CM43. These ordinances defined two categories
of government debt bonds that may be used in privatization transactions, both in accordance with the
clauses of the London Club Agreement. The first of these are Discount Bonds (DISCs), the second being
Front-Loaded Interest Reduction Bonds (FLIRBs). (Bond requisites are explained in Appendix...) There
are no restrictions concerning the entities permitted to use such instruments in privatization transactions,
i.e. they may be applied by both individuals and companies, after presenting all necessary papers in
accordance with the country's currency regulations.
Several important amendments were introduced by the ordinance of 1997. Firstly, the newly adopted
ordinance stipulated the procedure for acquiring and using foreign debt bonds as a payment instrument in
                                                       
42 officially published in the State Gazette ? 110 in 1994
43 Ordinances on the terms and conditions of participation in privatization with Bulgarian foreign debt bonds,
adopted respectively with Decree of the Council of Ministers # 278 of 25 November 1994, and Decree of the
Council of Ministers # 502 of 30 December 1997.
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privatization transactions, since these are considered useful both by the investors and other institutions
involved in this process.
Secondly, it introduces a differentiated approach to swap quotas for various types of bonds, i.e. when
concluding a privatization contract, no more than 50% of the acquired stock, shares or property value
may be covered by DISCs and no more than 75%  in the case of FLIRBs.
Thirdly, the practice of determining the BGN denomination on the basis of the BNB average fixed
exchange rate is no longer acceptable. This is due to the accelerated dynamics of the BGN/USD
exchange rate in the recent past, which in practice brought about distortions in BGN prices. For this
reason, BGN values are calculated by multiplying the USD value by the BGN/USD exchange rate on the
same day bonds are transferred to the account of the Ministry of Finance.
Finally, the first of these ordinances, that of 1994, specified that payment with Brady Bonds is only
permitted where the buyer undertakes not to transfer abroad the securities shares or enterprises acquired
in a privatization transaction for at least 4 years, and likewise not to transfer abroad the liquidation
share or price received following the sale of the securities, shares or enterprises acquired in the
transaction for at least 10 years. However, the later ordinance, that of 1997, abrogated this condition.
The accepted value of Brady Bonds was determined as follows:
? the value of DISCs is calculated in USD equal to their face value, whereas FLIRBs – are calculated
with a 50% reduction in their face value.
? the BGN value of Bonds is calculated as an amount equal to the USD value using an exchange rate
calculated for each specific privatization transaction, namely the average fixed exchange rate of the
Bulgarian National Bank for the past six months (the period starts from the day the respective
privatization transaction is signed).
According to the ordinances, Brady Bonds may not be used for:
? settling investment obligations or forfeiture under privatization contracts;
? state taxes and fees;
? other state and municipal claims;
? privatization though open sales of shares;
? participation in municipal privatization.
Experience has unearthed a whole set of problems in using foreign debt bonds and other payment
instruments in privatization transactions and these have still not been settled by the above-mentioned
regulation. This has resulted in the need to amend and supplement the existing regulations. In early 1995,
an amendment44 to the ordinance governing swaps with Brady Bonds resulted in:
? the introduction of limitations for capital repatriation and exportation of profits (such a
restriction is present in all debt conversion programs). In reality, profit obtained through acquired stocks,
shares or enterprises cannot be transferred earlier than four years following the conclusion of the
transaction. Capital transfers (the liquidation quota or price of the enterprise sold) are restricted for a 10-
year period. In general, these limitations are intended to improve the country’s short-term balance of
payment.
? the introduction of ceilings for swap volumes - foreign debt bonds cannot be used for
payment of more than 50% of stocks, shares or property acquired through privatization transactions.
? the recognition of buyers’ claims from calculated but unpaid interest on interest coupons as of
the day bonds are obtained. These receivables are to balance that portion of the price of shares, stocks or
property acquired through a privatization transaction which is not covered by foreign debt bonds.
4.2. Domestic Debt Bonds as a Payment Instrument in Privatization Transactions
                                                       
44 Decree of the Council of Ministers # 41 of 20 February 1995.
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Five types of domestic debt bonds have been recognized as legal tender in privatization transactions.
Firstly, ZUNKs were legally introduced as a privatization payment instrument in early 1994 by an
ordinance of the CM45. Between its introduction and abrogation, slightly less than two years, this
ordinance was amended and supplemented several times, in order to introduce operational improvements
in the conversion process and of course, to develop the secondary bonds market. In late 1995, it was
followed by another ordinance of the CM46, which introduced three other types of long-term domestic
debt bonds as legal tender in privatization transactions.
The following are most important new aspects of the above-mentioned and currently active ordinance:
? The types of long-term government bonds that may be converted to property were increased. At a
later stage, this will actually unify the statute concerning stocks originating from converting company
debt to government debt according to the structural reform carried out during the period 1991-1994.
(The requisites for the different bonds are quoted in Appendix...)
? The ordinance abolished restrictions on using long-term government bonds whether acquired from
the BNB or commercial banks and transforming bad loans into bonds, as a payment instrument in
privatization transactions. This is a very important step towards establishing a real market price and
free secondary trading, as well as creating incentives for investors.
? The ordinance also introduced comprehensive procedural and institutional regulations for using
domestic debt bonds as a payment instrument in privatization transactions.
Of all the domestic debt securities, ZUNKs were those most often used in privatization payments. Both
BGN- and USD-denominated ZUNKs may be used for purchase of stocks, shares, enterprises and/or
separate units of state property, by?
a. commercial banks which transformed bad loans into bonds and
b. private individuals and companies that have purchased such bonds from the central bank or else
commercial bank bonds from (a.)
The value of ZUNKs in BGN, denominated in USD, is calculated at the BNB exchange rate on the day
bonds are transferred to the Ministry of Finance47.
The above-described participants in ZUNK transactions must adhere to the provisions of Chapters 5 and
6 of the LTPSME. The imposed restriction was intended to provide commercial banks that have
transformed bad loans to long-term government bonds the opportunity to achieve rapid and effectively
low-income assets, i.e. ZUNKs. This restriction is no longer in force.
Following the initial regulation of ZUNKs, these bonds were used at their face value as a payment
instrument in privatization transactions. However, according to the BNB’s ordinance of April 199448, the
market price of ZUNKs is to be calculated by commercial banks, but may not be lower than the minimum
price calculated by the BNB (which is based on their discounted value plus a specific premium for using
them in the privatization process). For instance, over the 1994 – 1996 period the minimum price for
BGN-denominated bonds with a face value of 1,000 varied between BGN 665.60 and 700.00, while for
the USD-denominated bonds varied between USD 90.00 and 91.77 per USD 100 face value. Bearing in
mind the need to stimulate investor interest, the CM adopted decrees, according to which the above-
mentioned premiums (the incentive for using bonds in the privatization process) were set at?
40% till 31 December 199549;
                                                       
45 Ordinance on the terms and conditions of participation in privatization with ZUNKs, adopted with Decree of the
Council of Ministers # 36 of 16 February 1994.
46 Ordinance on the terms and conditions of participation in privatization with ZUNKs, bonds as per CMD #
244/1991, CMD # 186/1993, and CMD # 3/1994, adopted with Decree of the Council of Ministers # 221 of 22
November 1995.
47 According to the Ordinance on the terms and conditions of acquiring, servicing, and repaying ZUNKs, adopted
with Decree of the Council of Ministers # 33 of 14 February 1994.
48 Ordinance on the sanctioning of the commercial banks for losses from transaction with long-tern government
bonds under their market price, adopted with Decision of the BNB Governing Board # 125 of 12 April 1994;
abolished on 12 August 1997.
49 According to Decree of the Council of Ministers # 89 of 19 April 1995.
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40% till 30 June 199650;
30% till 31 December 199651.
In regulating swaps with domestic debt bonds, the ordinance also envisages long-term bonds being
accepted at their face value premium, as defined by the Council of Ministers, when they are used in
privatization transactions. Actually, after 1996 this premium was “zero”, i.e. there was no such premium,
due to the low minimum prices of the BNB (a 350 BGN premium for a ZUNK with a face value of 1000
BGN and a USD 45 premium for a ZUNK with a face value of USD 100). These provisions do not limit
free secondary trading of stocks. This means that investors may apply a reasonable reduction, formed as a
spread between the face value and the present value of the securities. This Ordinance # 14 of the BNB for
defining the minimum prices of ZUNKs, was later abrogated.
According to the currently active regulations on using domestic debt bonds in privatization payments,
there are no limitations on capital repatriation or exportation of profits, nor with regard to the volume of
domestic debt swaps. On the other hand, calculated but unpaid interest on interest coupons (as of the date
bonds are acquired), is not balanced against the price of the acquired shares or privatized property. It is
assumed that this interest is negligible.
4.3. Volume of Government Bonds Used as Legal Tender in Privatization
The total volume of debt instruments used as payment instruments in privatization transactions, including
both Brady Bonds and domestic debt bonds, was USD 412.7 million (see table below). This means that
equity-debt swaps account for almost 30% of the total fiscal effect (cash proceeds plus debt reduction due
to swaps).
Table 4-1.  Cash vs. Debt Instruments in Privatization Payments
Year Cash proceeds (million
USD)










Source: MF,BNB, IME's own calculations.
Almost 2/3 of the total volume of government bonds used in privatization payments has been domestic
debt bonds (in the Table 4-2. below, both domestic and foreign debt bonds are estimated in USD for
better comparison). The largest share of domestic debt bonds were USD-denominated ZUNKs – USD
201 million or 3/4 of the total volume of domestic debt bonds used.
Table 4-2.  Volume of Government Securities Used as Legal Tender in Privatization Transactions
(million USD)
Year Domestic Debt Bonds Brady Bonds Total
                                                       
50 According to Decree of the Council of Ministers # 263 of 29 December 1996.
51 According to Decree of the Council of Ministers # 263 of 29 December 1996.
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BGN-denominated USD-denominated
1994 25.58 - - 25.58
1995 27.33 7.50 112.44 147.28
1996 10.26 14.37 21.35 45.98
1997 5.81 39.64 6.62 52.06
1998 2.41 118.72 - 121.13
1999 - 20.70 - 20.70
Total 71.39 200.93 140.41 412.73
Note: BGN-denominated government bonds are: 1) ZUNK bonds denominated in leva; 2) bonds issued
under CM Decree No. 186/1993; and 3) bonds issued under CM Decree No. 3/1994. The USD-
denominated domestic debt bonds are ZUNKs denominated in USD.
The figures for 1999 do not include December.
Source: MF, BNB, IME's own calculations.
Investors clearly preferred FLIRBs in their payments with Bulgarian Brady Bonds, since they used such
bonds with a total face value of approximately USD 118 million (see Table  below). Within the range of
opportunities for domestic debt to property swaps, four types of government bonds were used (out of the
five legally permitted). The largest share were USD-denominated ZUNKs, whereas the largest debt
reduction was by BGN-denominated ZUNKs (about 64% of the volume of debt outstanding as of late
1995).
Table 4-3.  Volume of Different Bonds Used and Debt Reduction in the Period 1994 –1999.
Type of government bonds Total volume used Total debt reduction
DISCs USD 22.8 million 1.24%
FLIRBs USD 117.6 million 7.09%
USD-denominated ZUNKs USD 200.9 million 10.77%
BGN-denominated ZUNKs BGN 16.8 million 63.62%
Bonds as per CMD # 186/199352 BGN 2.3 million 36.38%
Bonds as per CMD # 3/199453 BGN 0.8 million 38.40%
Note: Total Brady Bonds debt reduction is estimated on the basis of the volume of bond issues; for
domestic debt bonds, the basis is the respective outstanding debt at the time of the legal introduction of
the swap mechanism.
Source: Ministry of Finance, IME's own calculations.
The overall reduction of official debt through equity-debt swaps was about 2.7%, estimated on the basis
of the debt at the end of 1994 (the BGN-denominated debt was converted into dollars for the purposes of
the calculation).
Over the period 1995 – 1997, the practice whereby investors used foreign debt bonds as a payment
instrument in privatization transactions was due to the income guaranteed with bonds payment, as well as
the opportunity to convert debt to property. For the purpose of the present report, the value of Brady
Bonds in BGN is calculated using the average weighted BGN/USD exchange rate for the respective year,
bearing in mind the fact that privatization revenues are received in BGN.
We may conclude that the mechanism for converting debt to property is not a panacea for solving the
country's problems, debts and development difficulties. This mechanism should be recognized as a useful
but limited tool for decreasing the nation's debts and attracting new investment. Due to its weaknesses,
this mechanism should not be regarded as a universal instrument. The goals achieved should be assessed
within the context of the entire macroeconomic strategy for the country's development.
                                                       
52 Bonds issued according to Decree of the Council of Ministers # 186 of 24 September 1993.
53 Bonds issued according to Decree of the Council of Ministers # 3 of 18 January 1994.
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5. COSTS OF PRIVATIZATION.
5.1. The case of Bulgaria.
Probably the best way to analyze the costs of Bulgaria's privatization is to examine the revenue side of
the non-budgetary fund called the Fund to cover the expenses arising from the privatization of state-
owned companies. In the period 1993 – 1998, this covered the expenses of all central privatization
bodies, but was administered by only one of them, namely the Privatization Agency. After 1998, it was
split into several funds, each of them covering the expenses of separate bodies. The tables below are
based on the allocation of privatization revenues to those funds. This allocation serves as the upper limit
for the expenses of these privatization bodies. It does not allow for separation of the costs of procedures,
















7Cost of privatization (m 1993 BGN), left axis
Cost of privatization as a percentage of
privatizationrevenues, right axis
Table5-1.  Costs of Privatization in Bulgaria
1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 Total
Million USD 0.6 1.2 2.6 1.8 1.8 11.3 16.7 36.0
% of
revenues
5.6 5.6 4.5 2.1 0.6 5.6 5.9 3.7
Source: Ministry of Finance, IME's own calculations.
On average, the costs of privatization were 3.7% of the total cash revenues from privatization. The
percentage of spending on an annual basis is difficult to calculate, as the Table provides only the
allocation of revenues, i.e. the portion of revenues that could be spent in the following years.
Table 5-2.  Costs, Revenues and Number of Transactions
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10.2 7.2 8.5 3.5 3.1 10.2 13.6 9.1
Source: Privatization Agency, Ministry of Finance, IME's own calculations.
Although the figures in the Table above do no represent the actual spending in the years indicated, it is
easy to follow the trend of privatization expenditure. Estimated in real terms (1993 BGN), the costs
changed only slightly over the period 1993 – 1997, but increased dramatically in the years 1998 and
1999, with costs in 1999 being 9 times higher than in 1997.
In examining the trends for numbers of transactions and costs by years, practically no correlation may be
established between the costs of privatization and the number of transactions. The same holds true for the
relationship between the volume of privatization revenues and costs. However, a kind of economy-of-
scale level was reached in 1997, when both total volume of costs and costs per transaction were at their
lowest for the whole period.
Opportunity cost of preferential sales to insiders
The direct expenditures in the privatization process seem to be insignificant, considering their 3.7% of
cash payments. They become even more negligible if we view them as a share not only of the cash
proceeds but also of total payments (including debt instruments) or total payments contracted. However,
the opportunity cost of the chosen privatization model, in terms of missed cash proceeds, should be
considered in order to fully appreciate privatization costs. In section 8, we stressed the opportunity cost of
the prevailing use of closed procedures and the inclusion of non-price commitments in privatization
contracts. Here we examine the cost of preferential sales to insiders.
Three types of preferences to insiders have been legally permitted since the very beginning of the
process. The Privatization Act of 1992 formulated these preferences in the following manner:
? Up to 20% of the shares in a company subject to privatization may be sold to insiders54 at preferential
terms; the price is 50% of their value, which is determined administratively.
? Any management-employee company, in which at least 20% of the current staff are shareholders,
may buy out the company subject to privatization, without any opening tender or auction procedure;
thus, the price of such a management-employee buy-out (MEBO) is the value of the company, which
is assessed administratively.
? A management-employee company may use a deferred payment scheme (up to ten years) when
selected as the new owner.
It has been the tradition of the privatization bodies that in most cases, a residual stake (of up to 20%) has
been offered to insiders. In almost all cases, these preferential shares were sold.
The technique of sales without tender or auction, although rarely used for the privatization of whole
companies (only 8.1% of all the transactions by the central privatizing agents), was prevalent in the
privatization of the separate units of companies (49.1%). The price at which such buy-outs took place
                                                       
54 The employees that have worked at least for two years; the employees who have been dismissed from the
company no more than 14 years ago; the pensioners who retired no more than 10 years ago; managers, working not
under labor contract, who have managed the company at least for one year.
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was based on an evaluation of the unit. Since insiders had the chance to influence these evaluations (for
they submitted most of the information required by the evaluating agent), most of these companies and
their separate units may safely be considered undervalued.
Table 5-3.  Number and share of MEBOs without tender or auction in the privatization of whole
companies and separate units (all central privatizing bodies) 1 Jan 1993 – 30 Nov 1999
Number Share (%)
Whole companies 154 8.1
Separate units 931 49.1
Source: Privatization Agency
The privatization law (especially its amendments in 1994-1996) introduced a special regime for MEBOs.
In particular, a preferential payment system allows management-employee buyer companies to make a
down payment amounting to 10% of the price offered, whilst scheduling the remaining 90% through
installments over a period of ten years. It was not until 1999, that privatization bodies were required to
discount the price offered by insider companies by the ranking of offers. In practice, this gave the
management-employee companies the opportunity to outbid any competition with only a slightly higher
price, but also one which was due in 10 years. A classic example of such an advantage is provided in the
box below. Following the early 1999 amendment to the Privatization Act, privatizing bodies were
required to apply a discount, but only a 10% discount was applicable for the whole 10-year period. The
situation was amended at the beginning of 2000, since when a 10% discount is due each year of the
deferred payment.
This preference was the main reason for the huge share of MEBOs – 44.3% in the period 1993 – 1998.
However, the isolated figures for 1998 alone indicate a considerably higher percentage of 73.4%.55 In
1999, management-employee companies won a third of all privatization contracts.
A striking illustration of the hidden cost of the deferred payment preference may be seen in a comparison
between contractual payments in such MEBOs and the actual proceeds in real terms. All such
transactions contracted before early 1997 (a period of hyperinflation) required new owners to pay only a
ludicrous fraction (in real terms) of the sum for which they had contracted. For instance, one such MEBO
from late 1996 required the new owner to pay the first installment of the deferred payment in late 1997
(with inflation at 579%), when it was almost 7 times lower (in real terms) than the sum contracted.
Table 5-4.  Consumer Price Index (1993 = 100)
Year 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
CPI 100 132 214 477 5 641 6 899 7 058 7 468
Source: Statistical Yearbook 1999, own calculations
The up to 20% stakes reserved for employees have probably had a insignificant hidden cost in terms of
missed revenues, compared to the other two preferences – deferred payments and sales without auction or
tender. Nevertheless, in the Table below, we hypothetically represent the missed revenues of the stakes
reserved for insiders in some of the largest privatization transactions. In this hypothetical example, we
assume that the reserved shares, if offered for competitive sale, would have had the same price as the
majority stake shares.
Table 5-5. Opportunity Cost of Reserved Stakes
                                                       
55 Privatization Agency, Privatization Strategy and Programme, no date (1999), p. 1. (actually, 1998 Annual Report













MDK* 56 80.0 14 20
Sheraton 67 22.3 18 6
Aroma 67 8.41 20 2.51
Eltos* 55 7.65 20 2.78
Burgasko Pivo 67 5.02 20 1.50
Note: * In the case of these companies the reserved stake includes the reservation for restitution claims.
Finally, although it is difficult to calculate, we believe that insider preferences have involved a high
opportunity cost in terms of missed higher prices due to two particular effects of the preference
arrangement (especially the deferred payment schemes and the sales without tender or auction), namely:
? limited demand for the companies (or their separate units);
? the incentives for insiders to influence the valuation of the companies (or their separate units).
This eventually meant the formal undervaluing of companies and more importantly, only one (price
competitive) buyer, namely the management-employee company.
The Case of Rodopa
Rodopa – Shumen  is one of three slaughterhouses in Bulgaria with an export license to the
member countries of the EU (the other two are Mecom – Silistra  and the slaughterhouse in
Svishtov). In late 1998, the company had liabilities amounting to over $7 million, due the
state budget, the United Bulgarian Bank and Bank Biochim. At that time there were two
main players in the privatization bid for Rodopa Shumen – Vanbouk  and the management-
employee company Rodopa – 97. Vanbouk's  bid was for $406,000 to be paid immediately
in cash and Rodopa-97's  bid was for $700,000 to be paid in cash over a ten-year period.
However, when discounted with 10% for each year of the deferred payment period, the
price offered by the management-employee company amounted to just under $300,000.
Therefore the opportunity cost of the MEBO (the offer of $406,000) would have been too
high.
However, this bid was submitted before the legal introduction of the discount procedure,
which would have formally meant that the MEBO offer was more competitive. Thus the
Executive Director of the Privatization Agency signed the contract for the sale of 67% of
Rodopa – Shumen  with Rodopa – 97 . It is believed the signing of the contract took place
only an hour after the members of the Supervisory Council decided to review the case at
their next meeting, due to uncertainty concerning the origin of the management-employee
company's funds. The above concerns were aired by a company closely related to the
rejected bidder – Vanbouk .
An examination of the origin of the management-employee company's funds must
obviously have been necessary, because the District Attorney in the town of Shumen asked
the local police chief to investigate the case. According to a letter from the Attorney
General to the Privatization Agency, an investigation is necessary “because of the potential
for criminal acts and unauthorized spending of Rodopa  funds, when the company made a
deposit to take part in the bid for 67% of Rodopa . It is believed the deposit amounting to
$39,000 was taken from the cash account of the privatized slaughterhouse.
Trade-off between Price and Non-price Future Commitments
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The concept of privatization prevalent among the staff of the privatizing bodies is of a process that aims
at developing the company, i.e. their task is not only to transfer property, but also to find “good” new
owners committed to “developing” the companies. This leads to the persistent use of “closed”
procedures, i.e. tenders and negotiations (see Table below). These techniques in turn allow for the
inclusion of a variety of non-price future commitments in the privatization contracts, such as the average
number of staff to be employed,  investment plans, preservation of the company’s previous activities,
etc.56
Table 5-6.  Share of “closed” and “open” procedures in the privatization of whole companies (all central




* “Open” procedures are auctions and public offers; “closed” procedures are tenders and negotiations.
Source: Privatization Agency
We believe that “closed” procedures reduce the potential amount of privatization revenues, at least for the
following  reasons:
1) the trade-off between the price and the non-price commitments;
2) the unclear rules of procedure reduce the number of interested investors, which means lower demand
and thus a lower price for the company;
3) discretionary power, resulting from the unclear rules for buyer selection may, in certain cases, mean
that the highest price offered is not the one selected.
Although it is difficult to estimate, there is a certain trade-off between the price offered and the promises
made by the new owner. The reason is that the assessment of offers is made on the basis of both price
offered and business plan submitted. This means that a buyer should have the best possible
comprehensive offer rather than highest offer price. A good example is the weightings recently applied
by the Ministry of Economy in the ranking of offers – 0.3 is given to the future employment program and
0.7 to the price.
However, these weightings are not always common and are almost never announced to the candidates
(actually, the recent practice employed by the Ministry of Economy should be considered an exception).
In practice, this makes the rules of procedure totally confusing, which in turn reduces investor interest.
This reduces the demand for and the eventual price of the privatized company.
No clear rules for buyer selection are outlined in the Ordinance on tenders57, where Art. 11 states that
“the buyer selected should be the one whose offer best satisfies the tender conditions”. Neither may such
rules be found in the case of direct negotiations and indeed no specific regulation whatsoever governs this
latter procedure. This makes it the least regulated and thus the most highly discretionary privatization
technique. Therefore, the risk of losing the highest price (and even the “best” offer, where such a
complex evaluation is possible) remains high.
For these reasons, we consider the prevailing use of tenders and negotiation, as well as the persistent
application of non-price future commitments, to equal high opportunity costs in terms of missed inflows
of cash to the budget. As it is impossible to measure the total opportunity cost of this selected
privatization model, we illustrate this issue with the following two cases.
The Case of Chimko
                                                       
56 For detailed review of privatization procedures and non-price future commitments see “Evaluation of the Post-
Privatization Monitoring System in Bulgaria”, CASE and IME, March 2000.
57 Adopted with a Decree of the Council of Ministers No. 155 of 14 August 1992.
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Privatization of the fertilize producer Chimko commenced in 1997 when the South Korean Daewoo and
the American Stellar Global companies showed interest in the company which at that time was a
profitable concern. Stellar Global offered a higher price - $100.2 million. According to the Privatization
Agency, the negotiations with Stellar Global were halted due to the fact that the company was facing
financial problems, which led to a delay in the privatization process. However the procedural delay itself
led to a deterioration of the plant's financial position, which resulted in a drastic fall in the selling price.
In the period 1997-1999, Chimko's liabilities increased due to higher gas prices. In 1998, new
negotiations were opened, when the minimum price was $38 million, but no buyers appeared. A year
later, a new negotiation was opened. IBE – Trans of New York and BTC partners registered in the British
Virgin Islands submitted their offers. The Privatization Agency chose IBE – Trans and in July last year, a
privatization contract was signed. According to the contract, a price of DM 1 million had to be paid in
and $50 million had to be invested over a period of 3 years. The old liabilities of the company (mainly
due the state-owned gas supplier Bulgargas) amounted to DM 70 million. The company’s debt decreased
to about DM 54 million after the state waived the forfeits.
Thus for a period of two years, the effective price (revenue plus liabilities) of Chimko fell from $100.2
million to DM 55 million. At the same time the actual proceeds to the budget were only DM 1 million
(down from $100.2 million).
The Case of Vinex
Vinex – Preslav, one of the largest white wine producers, was privatized in late 1999 after three
unsuccessful privatization procedures in a row. In the fourth procedure, two candidates appeared – a
former privatization fund St. Sofia and a Bulgarian company named Perinea. The selected candidate was
St. Sofia.
However, according to the rejected bidder, Perinea's offer was a higher price. According to Borislav
Banchev, owner of Perinea, the company offered a price for the majority of the shares amounting to
USD1.71 million and proposed a commitment to invest USD5.5 million. According to Mr. Banchev, at
the beginning of the bid procedure, his company offered USD1.1 million while the price offered by St.
Sofia was even lower. In the first phase of the negotiations, both companies offered higher prices but the
negotiations were terminated.
The fourth privatization procedure for Vinex attracted more bidders than those previously held, probably
due to the considerable reduction in the minimum price. During the first two privatization procedures,
there was no investor interest and in the third bid, only one offer was submitted by a management-
employee company. Two years ago, the starting price for the majority of the shares was approximately
USD10 million, whereas the last procedure involved no such fixed price. Last summer, the condition
imposed on the bidders was for them to pay a minimum $1.9million and at that time, only a management-
employee company submitted an offer, which later proved to be incomplete and thus the whole procedure
failed.
The current buyer had good a chance from the very beginning. Since October 1998, the Executive
Director of St. Sofia, Borislav Manachilov has been a member of the Vinex Board of Directors. He also
figured in the management of the management-employee company that had participated in the previous
procedure. Therefore, it is no surprise that St. Sofia won the bid so easily.
As in most of the cases, the delay in privatization led to deterioration in the financial performance of
Vinex. After all, the plant is not such a large debtor – it owes the state budget 1.5 million BGN and if we
add the dividends, corporate income tax etc. due the state, the total liabilities add up to some USD 2
million. Although Vinex has current liabilities due Reiffeisen Bank and United Bulgarian Bank, it is
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repaying these regularly. In the period 1997 – 1998, the company was in good financial standing and had
a BGN 1.26 million and BGN 0.4 million profit respectively. Since the end of 1999, the financial
condition of the company has deteriorated and it is now believed to have shown a loss of BGN 0.2
million.
Liabilities connected with restitution claims
The restitution of urban property and land was the first form of privatization undertaken in Bulgaria.
Eight restitution laws (adopted in 1991 - 1992) governed restitution of arable land and real estate where
(and if) such existed in kind.
The restitution of agricultural land has been the most complicated and controversial. This was due both to
the symbolic value attached to land restitution, which triggered considerable political controversy over
the implementation of the policy and due to legal issues arising from the definition of ownership of
restituted land. In spite of the relatively early adoption of the Ownership and Use of Agricultural Land
Act58, namely by the third quarter of 1996, only 18% of the arable land subject to restitution had actually
been returned, with defined boundaries, to its owners. At the same time, actual legal titles had been
issued for just 6% of the land. This, notwithstanding the fact that 54% of the claims had been processed
and ruled on. A significant acceleration of the land restitution process was observed after 1997. To a
great extent this progress was due to the amendments in the Land Law, which aimed at strengthening
ownership rights and introducing new provisions for claiming individual property rights. As a result, by
the end of 1998, 79.6% of the land subject to restitution had been returned to its owners/heirs59. By the
end of December 1999, restitution of 96% of the land was reported completed.
In the case of the restitution of urban property, the process had a relatively faster pace. Between 1992 and
1995, over 22,000 small and medium-sized entities had been privatized under the Restoration of the
Ownership of Nationalized Real Estate Act60, thereby resolving the larger part of the claims submitted by
previous owners and their heirs. Altogether however, the total value of restituted property between 1992
and 1996 amounts to some 2.5% of the country’s GDP for 1996. Moreover, disputes over property
arising in connection with the later disposal of state-owned assets have led observers to point out that
restitution ultimately slowed down the overall privatization process in Bulgaria.
The Privatization Act reserves 10% of privatized enterprises for restitution claims (in addition to the 20%
reserved for insiders).
The Compensation of Owners of Nationalized Property Act61 adopted in 1997 was aimed at broadening
the scope of restitution of formerly confiscated urban real estate and assets. The compensation
mechanisms introduced by the law were as follows:
? In the case of restitution claims against an already privatized enterprise, the claimants are
compensated in the form of shares from the state-owned stake in the enterprise or in the form of
compensatory bonds.
? In the case of restitution claims against an enterprise prohibited for privatization, the compensation
granted is in form of compensatory bonds.
? If the enterprise has not yet been privatized, the claimants receive shares in the company. If the value
of these shares is insufficient to cover all the claims, compensatory bonds are to be given for the
remaining part.
If the enterprise has been privatized in full and there is no state-owned share in its capital, the
compensation granted is only in the form of compensatory bonds.
                                                       
58 Adopted 1 March 1991.
59 Although legal titles had been issued only for 24 % of the land.
60 Adopted 21 February 1992.
61 Adopted 18 November 1997.
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The idea of this law is simple – to create a means of payment which the government grants to those
eligible for restitution of their former properties, allowing those means to be used in  privatization
transactions, e.g. to be converted into shares. The compensation process is equal to the possible use of so-
called compensatory bonds in privatization. The latter is a generic term for all three compensation means,
i.e. orders as such, temporary notices (which notify possession of formerly nationalized properties) and
compensatory bonds for nationalized living accommodation (houses, flats, etc.), i.e. “housing
compensation orders”.
District governors are entitled to register claims and claimants. Estimation of the assets subject to
compensation is the obligation of the state bodies (principal) that own the remaining government share
after privatization. In practice, it is difficult to estimate the exact amount of properties and owners that
will be involved in the process: properties were transformed, estates were changed or vanished as
physical assets and the heirs of former owners have dispersed.
5.2. The case of Poland.
Table 5-7. shows that direct costs of privatization constitute a decreasing fraction of total privatization
revenues. The greatest costs have obviously been connected with the implementation of the process. For
example, the cost of the capital privatization of the first 5 companies privatized in this way amounted to
21%62 of privatization revenues and 13% of the value of all companies, following which, as may be
observed in Table5-7. and Figure 5-2., the cost began to fall. This reduction, as noted by Baltowski
(1998) may be linked to two factors. Firstly, since 1992 the very expensive foreign consulting companies
hired to prepare and implement the privatization procedures have been systematically replaced by much
cheaper domestic firms. The second reason is that in 1995, a new law on public ordering was introduced
and this put much pressure and obligation on privatization agencies to economize in their selection of
privatization consultants.
Likewise it is possible that the centralization of the privatization process since 1997 may also reduce the
direct costs of privatization. This means that some fixed costs or quasi-fixed costs such as promotion and
staff salaries may now be incurred only in one ministry as opposed to several.
Table 5-7. Direct costs of privatization in the years 1991-1998
Millions of PLN
1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999
Costs as a percentage of
privatization revenues
13.8% 7.6% 5.4% 9.7% 8.2% 3.4% 1.1% 2.0% 1.0%
Source: Reports on the achievement of the state budget in the years 1991-1998 and own calculations.
Figure 5-2.
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Costs as a percentage of revenues
Costs as a percentage of revenues 13.8% 7.6% 5.4% 9.7% 8.2% 3.4% 1.1% 2.0% 1.0%
1991.00 1992.00 1993.00 1994.00 1995.00 1996.00 1997.00 1998.00 1999.00
However, neither the above Table nor the graph take into account the costs of the NIF program.
According to the report of the Supreme Auditing Chamber (Najwyzsza Izba Kontroli – NIK) the total
cost of the NIF program at the end of 1995 was equal to 150.7 million PLZ. However 48.7 million PLZ
of this figure was mainly covered by PHARE and USAID funds.
The other cost item in this program is the annual payment for the management of NIF assets. This
payment is paid by the State Treasury to the private companies hired by the NIF boards. Between July
1995 and December 1996, these payment amounted to more then 46 million USD, approximately 115
million zlotys. However these costs must be counted separately and for more than one reason should not
be treated as direct costs of privatization: costs related to the NIF program are usually counted separately
in all statistics, since this was not a program of privatization as such, but rather a non-equivalent transfer
of property rights. Moreover, it was a once only action and is therefore hardly comparable to “the rest of
privatization” which is spread out over a long period.
Costs of maintaining privatization bodies
Until 1997, it is almost impossible to asses the costs of maintaining privatization bodies in Poland, since
the privatization process, as already mentioned, has been performed by several ministries and all the
country's voivodships. The former Ministry of Ownership Transformation was not only responsible for
controlling some aspects of privatization, but also carried out other objectives such as: monitoring and
subsidizing dependent enterprises.
Following the reform of 1997, the situation changed but this does not mean that any exact assessment of
these kinds of costs is possible. The newly created MST is now fully responsible for the entire
privatization process, but privatization continues to be not the only task of this ministry.
Costs of non-equivalent privatization
“The Privatization Program up to 2001” limited the analysis and projections of the cost of the non-
equivalent privatization program only to the distribution of free shares to the employees of the privatized
companies. It estimated the cost of this part of the program for the period from 1998 to 2005 at 8 billion
PLN (see Table 6-7.).
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Initially, the Privatization Law passed by parliament on 13th July 1990 regulated the process of
transferring free shares to employees. According to this Act, employees of commercialized State-owned
Enterprises were given the right to purchase up to 20% of the shares in the privatized companies on
preferential terms. The shares offered to the employees were 50% cheaper than the shares offered to
Polish citizens in the form of a public offer. Under the political pressure of the left-wing parties, a new
Privatization Act (the Law on Commercialization and Privatization of State Enterprises) was passed by
parliament in the summer of 1996. This guaranteed even greater preferences for the employees of the
privatized companies.
The new Law stipulated that employees of privatized companies could obtain free of charge up to 15% of
the shares in their enterprises, but the value of such shares could not exceed the value of the 18th or 24th
average monthly salaries in the productive sector. Another 15% of the shares were reserved and could be
provided free to the farmers or fisherman who had acted in the past as suppliers to the privatized
companies. A special stipulation also regulated the free transfer of up to 15%, of shares to the employees
of the enterprises included in the National Investment Fund program. The law on NIF was passed on 30th
April 1993. However, the Act concerned only 512 of the companies included in the program. It should be
emphasized that these three regulations were aimed at convincing and persuading insiders to agree on
commencing the ownership transformation processes in their enterprises.
According to the report of the Supreme Auditing Chamber (NIK) published in 199963, under the Law on
Commercialization and Privatization of State Enterprises, as of 30th of September 1998, free or
preferential shares had been transferred in the case of 236 companies. The total nominal value of these
stocks and shares amounted to 5.3 billion PLN (free and preferential shares were transferred to 412,000
employees of privatized companies and 33,500 farmers and fisherman. The value of these shares
amounted to 5,277 and 0,23 billion PLN respectively). In order to estimate the cost of the transfer of free
shares to the employees of the privatized companies, we must also take into consideration the Wholly-
owned Treasury Companies included in the Mass Privatization Program (MPP). As of the end of 1996,
the total book value of shares transferred to employees and farmers and fisherman under the Law on the
National Investment Funds Program may be estimated at 1 billion PLN64. This estimate was based on the
book value of 512 companies included in the program at the time when the fourth (and in fact the last)
group of the companies was included in the program. As of 30th of September 1998, the total cost of free
and preferential shares could be estimated at 6.3 billion PLN65. Additionally, according to the
“Privatization Program to 2001” the value of free shares to be transferred to employees and the suppliers
of the privatized companies to 2001, will amount to 8 billion PLN (see Table 6-7.). However, the
representatives of the Ministry of Finance estimate that this cost will also increase and will amount to 11
billion PLN66. If we summarize these figures, the total cost of the program will by then amount to 17.3
billion PLN (see Table 5-8)67.
Table 5-8. Assessment of the total cost of a non-equivalent privatization in the form of a distribution of
free or preferential shares to the employees of the privatized companies.
The cost of free or preferential shares transferred to
the employees and suppliers of the privatized
companies in billion PLN according to:
1990-1998 1999- 1990-
- the Law on Commercialization and Privatization
of State Enterprises, enacted in 1990 and 1996
5.3 11 16.3
                                                       
63 “Informacja o wynikach kontroli procesu nieodplatnego nabywania akcji przez pracowników i innych
uprawnionych w procesie prywatyzacji przedsiebiorstw”, NIK, Warszawa, 1999
64 own estimate on a base of unpublished data form the Ministry of State Treasury.
65 Not taking into consideration the fiscal impact and the cost of the lost opportunities of the companies privatized
on the preferential terms under the MEBO scheme, but such a research has not been done yet.
66 M. Psikorski, “Poslowie podzielili pieniadze”, Rzeczpospolita, 1999.10.09, Warszawa
67 These are only the rough estimates made by the author, as there are no systematic database available on this issue.
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- the Law on National Investment Funds 1 0 1
TOTAL 6.3 11 17.3
However, this non-equivalent privatization scheme will not be limited only to the transfer of free shares
to the employees and suppliers of the privatized companies. It results from a political decision finally
agreed upon by the coalition parties (under the pressure of the senior coalition party)68 in March 2000. It
may have enormous impact on the overall cost of the non-equivalent privatization program. The
additional costs resulting from extending this program were not taken into account in the “Privatization
Program to 2001” report. This program will cater for those citizens who have not obtained any free or
preferential shares. The indirect non-equivalent privatization program will be financed by the resources
obtained from the privatization process.
Initially, the AWS party proposed that 25% of the shares of privatizing enterprises should finance the
extended non-equivalent privatization scheme. Later AWS agreed on a figure of 9%. On the other hand,
the Union of Freedom party did not agree to the extension of the non-equivalent privatization program,
arguing that financing pension reform, the compensation program and the restitution program from
privatization sources is a kind of non-equivalent privatization. Additionally, Union of Freedom
underlined that privatization stocks are limited and it will in time become a serious problem to fully
finance already existing social and compensation programs through the incomes obtained from
privatization. However, after long negotiations the coalition parties agreed that up to 7%69 of the shares
of privatizing enterprises (excluding those companies where the privatization process has already started)
will finance the extended non-equivalent privatization scheme. The Minister of State Treasury, Emil
Wasacz announced that according to preliminary estimates, extending the indirect non-equivalent
privatization program will cost at least 3.5 billion PLN70. There is no data concerning the cost of the
direct non-equivalent privatization program (e.g. the free transfer of municipal flats to their present
users), as no comprehensive and systemic decision has been taken.
Dynamics of share of direct costs of privatization in privatization proceeds for Bulgaria and Poland
presented in Figure 5-3. Reveals significant similarities. In both countries the costs systematically have
been  declining from the relatively high level in early stage of privatization to the level not exceeding 2%
of revenues for Poland and about 5% for Bulgaria.
                                                       
68 The main explanation raised by the MP from the AWS was that all citizens should benefit from the privatization
process, not only the employees of the productive sector.
69 The Law stipulates that limit of 7 percent can be decreased if the assumed incomes from the privatization are not
achieved in the previous calendar year.
70 “7 procent akcji na uwlaszczenie”, Rzeczpospolita, 08.03.2000;
Figure 5-3
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Source: Tables in the text.
In the case of Bulgaria, the estimate of the costs of privatization is based on the revenue side of the Fund
covering the expenses of the privatization bodies. As the share of this fund in the allocation of revenues is
determined by the Privatization Act, the share of the costs in revenues has been on average approximately
5%. The sharp fall in 1996-1997 followed by another increase in 1998 was probably the result of the time
lag between the moment cash proceeds were received and the moment funds were distributed to the
various funds and accounts.
6. ALLOCATION OF REVENUES FROM PRIVATIZATION.
6.1. The Case of Bulgaria.
The original Privatization Act71 of 1992 outlined the eventual practical use of the proceeds from
privatization, listing 5 non-budgetary accounts as destinations for these revenues.
Table 6-1.  Types of non-budgetary funds according to the original Privatization Act of 1992.
Funds Share (%)
Fund covering the expenses of the central privatizing bodies Not fixed*
Mutual Fund 20
Social Security Fund 30
State Fund for Reconstruction and Development Not fixed*
Support of the Agricultural Development Fund 10
Note: The 1993 Privatization Program fixed the allocation share of these two funds at 30% and 10%
respectively.
In 1994, an amendment to the Act changed the structure of allocation and determined the shares of
revenue for each of the funds. Another amendment in 1995 rescheduled the allocation shares to the
various funds. The share of different funds in the allocation procedure set by the Privatization Act for the
two periods – before and after the amendment of 1995 – is given in the Table  below.
                                                       
71 The formal name is Transformation and Privatization of State-owned and Municipal Enterprises, adopted on 8
May 1992.















Table 6-2.  Types and (%) shares of non-budgetary funds in the allocation of privatization cash revenues
according to the 1994 and 1995 amendments of the Privatization Act.
Funds 1994 – 1995 1995 – 1996
Mutual Fund 20.0 20.0
Fund covering the expenses of the central privatizing bodies 5.6 5.6
National Environmental Protection Fund 4.0 4.0
Support of the Agricultural Development Fund72 12.0 24.0
State Fund for Reconstruction and Development 58.4 46.4
In 1997, the allocation procedure for privatization revenues was amended again, when the Mutual Fund
was cancelled. The same amendment introduced two more funds to the allocation procedure – the Social
Security Fund and the Artists’ Fund of the Ministry of Culture – as well as changing the funds’ shares in
the allocation of privatization revenues.
Table 6-3.  Types and (%) shares of non-budgetary funds in the allocation of privatization cash revenues
according to the 1997 amendment of the Privatization Act.
Funds 1997 – 1999
Fund covering the expenses of the central privatizing bodies 10
National Environmental Protection Fund 5
Agriculture Fund 26
Tobacco Fund 4
State Fund for Reconstruction and Development 33
Social Security Fund 20
Artists’ Fund of the Ministry of Culture 2
The titles of the respective funds provide a clear picture of the actual purpose of the revenues73 allocated.
Besides, the Budget Act of 1996 proclaimed that cash revenues from the privatization of 6 companies
would go directly as subsidies to medical schools, hospitals and a special fund of the Ministry of Health
(the largest of these companies was sold for USD 4.05 million).
This precise regulation of privatization proceeds (except those from “cash privatization” as described
below) allocation lasted until 199974, since when the revenues have been divided between the central
budget (90%) and the Fund covering the expenses of the central privatizing bodies (10%). As a result, the
Budget Act of 2000 contains the following truism: “Revenues from privatization of state-owned
companies shall be used for budget deficit financing and official debt restructuring.”75 Thus the clear
division between the spending purposes ceased to exist in the case of privatization proceeds.
Since 199776 an annual list of attractive companies that are to be privatized only against cash payments
has been approved by the Council of Ministers. 96% of the proceeds from this so-called “cash
privatization” goes directly to the central budget and is used for official debt reduction. The seven largest
                                                       
72 In 1995 Support of the Agricultural Development Fund split into two separate funds: Agriculture Fund and
Tobacco Fund; after 1995 they receive respectively 26 % and 4 % of the revenues.
73 The greatest share held the State Fund for Reconstruction and Development (SFRD). It was created in 1991
having as main aim the support of the structural reform and the payments on the foreign debt. SFRD extended short-
and medium-term credits through selected commercial banks after the necessary money for the foreign debt
payments had been allocated. Besides the privatization revenues other sources of funding for the SFRD were
credits, subsidies and transfers. In 1998 the Fund was closed following the arrangements in the Memorandum with
IMF.
The Mutual Funds’ money used to be transferred to the Social Security Funds by the end of the fiscal year.
74 The Privatization Act was amended in the here discussed part on 12 February 1999.
75 The 2000 Budget Act, § 5 of the Transitory and Concluding Provisions.
76 Amendment of the Privatization Act was made in late-1996.
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transactions for the sale of “cash privatization” companies are listed in the Table  below. Altogether these
have provided USD 478 million in cash revenues, which is 21% of all payments contracted and 34% of
all cash proceeds from privatization to the year 2000.
Table 6-4. The seven largest transactions from the “cash privatization” lists.
Company Sector Shares sold (%) Price (Million USD)
Sodi – Devnya Chemical industry 60 160
Neftochim – Burgas Chemical industry 58 101
MDK – Pirdop Copper production 56   80
Petrol – Sofia Chemical industry 51   52
Devnya Cement Cement production 70   45
Interpred WTC – Sofia Trade 70   20
Druzhba - Plovdiv Glass production 51   20
Total 478
Source: Privatization Agency
Allocation of Privatization Revenues
The cash proceeds from privatization have been allocated strictly according to the procedure provided by
the Privatization Act and the annual Privatization Programs (thoroughly described in section 4).
According to these regulations, privatization revenues are generally directed in two directions:
? The central budget;
? Non-budgetary funds specified in the Privatization Act.
The allocation procedure has been constantly amended throughout the whole privatization process. In
practice, it has passed through 6 important amendments to the Privatization Act. Meanwhile, other
regulations that affected the allocation procedure (such as the Budget Acts and the Privatization
Programs), were also amended.
Table 6-5.  Actual Allocation of Privatization Revenues (Percentage share of cash proceeds)
Destination 1993-94 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999
Central Budget - - - 84.2 54.0 65.7
Fund covering the expenses of the
central privatization bodies
5.6 4.5 2.1 0.6 5.6 5.9
Support of the Agricultural
Development Fund
- 9.2 - - - -
Mutual Fund 20.0 12.2 19.5 0.4 - -
National Environmental
Protection Fund
4.0 3.2 1.5 0.4 2.8 -
Agriculture Fund 12.0 0.6 7.9 2.1 14.7 -
Tobacco Fund - 0.1 1.2 0.3 2.3 -
State Fund for Reconstruction and
Development
58.4 46.1 17.5 4.6 18.1 -
Artists’ Fund of the Ministry of
Culture
- - 5.9 - 1.1 -
Social Security Fund - - - 2.5 10.7 -
Universities, ministries and
hospitals
- - - 1.7 1.2 -
Fund-raising budgetary account - 24.1 44.4 3.2 (10.5) 28.4
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Source: Ministry of Finance
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The Table above presents the actual share allocated to the different destinations for privatization cash
proceeds. Several facts are worth noting:
? The cash proceeds gathered in the first two years of the privatization process (1993 and 1994) were
allocated to non-budgetary funds at the end of 1994 in strict accordance with the already amended
procedure. Thus the procedure from the original Privatization Act of 1992, supplemented by the 1993
Privatization Program, was never actually applied.
? After 1995, the practice of maintaining residual funds (remaining in the fund-raising account)
emerged, i.e. the money distributed to the funds was less than the actual cash proceeds. The only
exception to this is the year 1998 (the negative figure for the fund-raising account is given in
brackets), when just the opposite happened – the money exceeded the privatization revenues
received.
? The allocation shares after 1995 do not follow the allocation procedure as described in section 4.
Three major reasons for this exist:
1) the allocation of the cash proceed from the 4th quarter of the year takes place at the beginning
of the next year (which is also the reason for the residual funds described above);
2) the amendments to the allocation procedure are often introduced in the middle of the year
and applied directly, i.e. the percentage share resembles neither the amended or the newly
applied procedure;
3) After 1997, “cash privatization” appeared. Meanwhile, the allocation procedure remained
active for the non-cash privatization proceeds. However, in the Table  above, the percentage
shared is calculated on the basis of the total privatization revenues for the respective year.
Although the titles of funds provide a reasonably clear idea of the use of the cash proceeds from
privatization, in the following paragraph we examine more closely the eventual allocation of the
privatization money, as well as some of the important features of the allocation procedure.
The non-budgetary Fund covering the expenses of the central privatization bodies was administered by
the Privatization Agency. It existed until 1998 when it split into separate funds for the separate bodies.
The Privatization Act established the Mutual Fund in 1992, the main idea being to use the collected funds
for the Social Security Fund and the Fund for compensation of former owners. From the end of 1995, the
money collected in the Mutual Fund was allocated to the Social Security Fund for pensions77. The Fund
was canceled in 199778 and the money collected so far was to be redistributed to the Social Security
Fund.
Besides the Social Security Fund, another mandatory insurance fund was eligible for privatization
proceeds allocation, namely the Professional Qualification and Unemployment Fund. However, no
explicit data is available on distinction between their shares (thus in the Table above, they are listed as
Social Security Funds). Since mid 1998, no less than 50% of the money for the social security funds was
due to go to the National Health Insurance Fund.
The 1996 Budget Act79 postulated that the revenues from the privatization of 6 specific companies should
be allocated in the following special way:
? To the Ministry of Health Care Fund, to cover the cost of life-sustaining medicines already used in
1996 – up to BGN 4.5 million.
                                                       
77 According to § 35 of the Transitory and Concluding Provisions of the Amendment of the Privatization Act of 15
December 1995.
78 Amendment of the Privatization Act of 7 October 1997.
79 Actually § 6 of the Transitory and Concluding Provisions of the Amendment of the Budget Act of 20 December
1996.
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? To medical schools and university hospitals, to cover heating and electricity costs, as well as the
costs of medicines —  up to BGN 1.3 million.
? To orphanages, to cover food costs —  up to 0.3 million.
In 1996, the revenue from the above mentioned 6 companies barely reached BGN 0.5 million and this
was in its entirety allocated to the Ministry of Health Care.
By August 1997, all the above mentioned six companies had been sold. At that time the allocation of the
cash proceeds from their privatization was roughly:
? Ministry of Health Care – USD 1.5 million;
? Medical schools and university hospitals – USD 2 million;
? Orphanages – USD 0.2 million.
The funds remaining at the end of 1998 were allocated to the medical schools and the university
hospitals.
In 199780 a brand new article was introduced to the Privatization Act to regulate the allocation of cash
proceeds from privatization-related activities, as well as the allocation of money from forfeits for breach
of privatization contracts. The allocation procedure was as follows:
? To the Fund covering the expenses of the central privatization bodies – revenue from events
associated with the privatization process (sale of memoranda, auction documentation, advertising,
publishing and other activities) as well as any auction/tender/negotiation deposits appropriated;
? To the State Fund for Reconstruction and Development – forfeits for breach of the clauses regarding
investments in privatization contracts;
? To the Social Security Fund and compensation for former owners – forfeits for breach of the clauses
regarding jobs in privatization contracts;
? To the Central Budget – forfeits81 for breach of the clauses regarding other commitments in
privatization contracts.
This procedure has since been amended twice. Presently, cash proceeds from privatization-related
activities go in two directions – to the Fund covering the expenses of the central privatization bodies and
the Central Budget (all the forfeits for breach of privatization contracts).
Funds from the privatization of separate units and buildings under construction, undistributed since 30
June 1994, may remain at the disposal of a company after a deduction of 20% to the Mutual Fund, where
approved is granted by the respective central privatizing body. On the one hand, this new regulation has
limited the revenue from privatization that is allocated to supporting the agriculture industry, ecological
purposes, reconstruction and development, but on the other hand, has had a positive effect by aiding these
companies' rehabilitation and making them more attractive to investors. Moreover, since late 1997 the
revenues from the sale of separate units have remained in the hands of the respective company82.
6.2. The Case of Poland.
Since the “Privatization program up to 2001” was prepared in 1998, before the introduction of the social
and compensation programs, the Ministry of Finance has had to update its estimates and prognoses of the
costs of these programs. According to the new projections, the cost of the social programs to be covered
by the privatization revenues will be much higher than was assumed in the “Privatization program to
2001”.
                                                       
80 Amendment of the Privatization Act of 7 October 1997.
81 For full description of forfeits procedure and practice see “Evaluation of the Post-Privatization Monitoring
System in Bulgaria”, CASE and IME, March 2000.
82 Amendment of the Privatization Act of 19 December 1997.
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First of all, the cost of the restitution program is still not known, as the agreement concerning to what
extent it is to be financed has not yet been reached by the Government, the unions and the associations of
former owners. If we consider the most optimistic scenario83 (meeting a partial - 50% fulfillment of the
restitution claims) and the only one considered by the Ministry of Finance, this would result in the cost of
the restitution program being much higher than was planned in the “Privatization Program to 2001”. The
cost of the program will be at least 25-35 billion PLN more and amount to 95 billion PLN84.
Secondly, the cost of  pension reform will be much higher than was initially planned (Table  6-6.). This is
a result of the very poor implementation of the program by the ruling parties (it being initially
implemented by politicians and not economists) and the financial condition of ZUS (the State Agency of
Social Insurance) being even more catastrophic than had been expected. According to the Ministry of
Finance, the cost of pension reform to 2001 will amount to 28 billion PLN and will be 8 billion PLN
higher during this period than was planned in 1998. At present, the Ministry of Finance estimates that the
cost of pension reform will exceed 63 billion PLN by 2003 (the Privatization Program to 2001 assumed
that the cost of pension reform would amount to 54 billion PLN by 2005).
Table 6-6.   The cost of pension reform in particular years.
Year 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
Cost in Billion PLN 4 11 13 16.9 18.5
Source: Ministry of Finance, 2000
Thirdly, the ruling political forces, under pressure from the senior coalition party (AWS), have reached
an agreement on a more comprehensive non-equivalent privatization scheme than was expected in 1998.
Fourthly, incomes from privatization still support the current budgetary expenditures. For example, the
Ministry of Finance earmarked 5.58 billion PLN to cover the budgetary deficit in 2000.
Table 6-7.  Comparison of the assumed cost of social programs financed by privatization revenues as of
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83 optimistic form the public finance point of view
84 “Kierunki Prywatyzacji Skarbu Panstwa w 2000 r.”, The Ministry of State Treasury, Warsaw, 1999.
85 Estimates as of 1 May 2000. In order to make these data comparable the cost of the particular programs occurred
already in 1998 and 1999 were included
86 The cost of the pension system reform only up to 2003
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Source: “Privatization Program to 2001”, Ministry of the Treasury, 1998
If we compare the costs of the programs included in the “Privatization Program to 2001” with the present
estimates or the real cost already incurred, only the cost of the compensation program is going to be
lower than was initially expected. The Ministry of Finance has explained that the most pessimistic
scenario was taken into consideration. The real cost of the program will be 7 billion PLN lower than was
originally expected and will amount to 13 billion PLN.
To summarize, expectations regarding the value of State property are still enormously high, despite the
fact that the transformation process began over 10 years ago. On the other hand, the cost of the programs
financed by privatization revenues is going to be very high.
The value of State property was optimistically estimated in the “Privatization Program to 2001” at almost
233 billion PLN. Moreover, the State Treasury in 1998 obtained 13 billion PLN and in 1999 over 20
billion PLN from privatization. We might therefore theoretically assume that the State will obtain
approximately 200 billion from privatization. In fact, as mentioned earlier, these estimates are too
optimistic and there is a real threat that the potential privatization revenues will be much lower.
At present, the total cost of the major social programs alone should be estimated at 185.5 billion PLN87.
However, these are still very rough estimates, as the organization of the restitution program has yet to be
determined. The adoption of any particular plan for the restitution program may dramatically change all
predictions and estimates. Moreover, we should not forget about the privatization revenues consumed by
the budget. For example, this year the central budget will consume over 5 billion PLN.
More threatening is the fact that the costs of social programs are growing systematically (Table 6-7.
presents a comparison of the assumed cost of social programs financed by privatization revenues as of 1st
May 2000 and the cost presented in the “Privatization Program up to 2001”). Although it is very difficult
to fully compare the cost of the programs to be financed from incomes obtained from privatization, since
for some programs the time horizon of some estimates cannot be compared, the cost projections
presented in the Privatization Program are much lower (more optimistic) than the present estimates of the
Ministry of Finance. It is clear that the cost of pension reform will be higher. The same applies to the
non-equivalent privatization program. Only the cost of the compensation program will probably be lower.
In fact, according to the estimates presented above the real threat exists that there is already insufficient
money to cover the cost of  all existing social programs that were supposed to be covered by the sources
obtained from privatization. As a result, there is no possibility of fully meeting the restitution claims, as
the privatization revenues are already very limited and the budget will never manage to bear such a
painful burden.
                                                       
87 Considering the cost of the pension reform only up to 2005
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CONCLUSIONS
Comparison of fiscal dimension of privatization process in Bulgaria and in Poland reveals both
similarities and differences. On the contrary to Poland, where privatization proceeds have been one of the
highest priorities of the privatization strategy, fiscal objectives have rarely been referred to as a priority in
the modeling and execution of Bulgaria's privatization policy.
In practice, privatization revenues in Bulgaria and in  Poland constitute a continuously increasing part of
total budget revenues and therefore, their fiscal effects are significant in the planning of the budget and
economic policy in both countries..
Indirect privatization in Poland and cash case-by-case privatization is the main source of revenues. In the
last three years, the share of the largest privatization contracts in total privatization revenues in Poland, to
lesser extend in Bulgaria,  has increased sharply. However, since the number of large and strong
companies is limited, one should not treat privatization as a source of substantial  budget revenues over
the long term.
The privatization revenues structure in both countries is characterized by relatively high level of
concentration, measured by the number of major providers of revenues. In case of Poland, especially
since mid-90ties, major providers, as a rule, became the privatized banks. This is not the case of Bulgaria,
where major providers have been exclusively industrial enterprises.
Governments of both countries tend to underestimate future privatization revenues. This would seem to
be the result of two factors: unexpected changes on financial markets and excessive caution on the part of
the government in planning revenues, which does not need to be intentional. For both the countries under
discussion, this is the best way to create government reserves that could be used to cover gaps in current
expenditures.
There were significant differences between Bulgaria and Poland policy with regard to the allocation of
the revenues from privatization. Actually, both countries uses principally different approaches, changing
over the entire period from the very beginning of the privatization process. Formally, according to
regulations, privatization revenues in Bulgaria suppose to be directed to the central budget and to strictly
specified non-budgetary funds. In practice,  the allocation procedure has been constantly amended
throughout the whole privatization process. While the privatization revenues in Bulgaria were and still
are used to cover the gap in current governmental expenditure and to reduce official debt, in Poland for
the last two-three years privatization proceeds are to be used for covering costs of the implementation of
large social programs.
Foreign investment constituted an important part of privatization revenues and seems to be mainly driven
by occasional large privatization contracts. However, in the contrary to Bulgaria, where  foreign
investments amounted to 42% of the total FDI volume for the period 1993-1999, in Poland privatization
proceeds from foreign investors are not a large part of total FDI, due to the relatively high total volume of
foreign investments in the Polish economy.
A variety of payment instruments were used in Bulgaria in the privatization deals, including foreign and
domestic debt bonds. This broadens the gap between the total financial effect reported and the actual
budget revenues from privatization. However, recently there are signs of improved revenue strategy in
Bulgaria, resulted in the higher cash share in the 1999 payments.  A factor which supports this
development is also the lower share of MEBO’s in the total deals concluded. Contrary to the situation in
Bulgaria, cash is the main payment instrument in the Polish privatization process.
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Direct costs of privatization in both countries are relatively small and constitute a decreasing fraction of
privatization revenues. The costs of privatization in Bulgaria were on average 3.7% of the total cash
revenues from privatization. The greatest costs have been connected with the implementation of the
process, when the cost of the capital privatization in Poland amounted to 21% of privatization revenues,
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Table: Major Bulgarian revenue providers and their share in total privatization revenues in the years
1993-1999
m USD m USD
1993 Total contractual payments
Name of the company Branch Price The biggest:
Tzarevichni Producti - Razgrad food industry  20,00 1 as the percent of total
privatization revenues
Svoboda - Kristal - Kamenovo food industry  4,39 3 as the percent of total
privatization revenues
Republika - Svoge food industry  2,00 5 as the percent of total
privatization revenues
Nektar - Silistra food industry  1,38
Odiana - Sofia  1,29
1994 Total contractual payments
Name of the company Branch Price The biggest:
Hotel Vitosha-Sofia tourism  41,80 1 as the percent of total
privatization revenues
Zagorka - Stara Zagora brewery  21,70 3 as the percent of total
privatization revenues
Grand Hotel Varna tourism  9,36 5 as the percent of total
privatization revenues
SOMAT- Sofia transport  8,22
Chimimport trade  7,05
1995 Total contractual payments
Name of the company Branch Price The biggest:
Burgasko Pivo - Burgas brewery  5,02 1 as the percent of total
privatization revenues
Astika brewery  5,00 3 as the percent of total
privatization revenues
Kamenitza Plovdiv brewery  4,88 5 as the percent of total
privatization revenues
Prima Lakta-Lovech food industry  3,48
Kabel Komers Burgas el.engineering  2,99
1996 Total contractual payments
Name of the company Branch Price The biggest:
Sheraton - Sofia tourism  22,30 1 as the percent of total
privatization revenues
Aroma cosmetics  8,41 3 as the percent of total
privatization revenues
Eltos - Lovech el.engineering  7,65 5 as the percent of total
privatization revenues
Energokabel el.engineering  7,23
Vidima Sevlievo sanitary fittings  5,40
1997 Total contractual payments
Name of the company Branch Price The biggest:
Sody Devnya chemical ind.  160,00 1 as the percent of total
privatization revenues
MDK - Pirdop copper prod.  80,00 3 as the percent of total
privatization revenues
Devnya Cement-Devnya cement prod.  44,55 5 as the percent of total
privatization revenues
Interpret WTC - Sofia trade  20,00
Albena resort - Balchik tourism  10,11
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1998 Total contractual payments
Name of the company Branch Price The biggest:
Druzhba JSCo.-Plovdiv glass  20,00 1 as the percent of total
privatization revenues
Somat -Sofia transport  13,70 3 as the percent of total
privatization revenues
Polimeri - Devnia chemical ind.  12,95 5 as the percent of total
privatization revenues
Novotel Evropa-Sofia tourism  12,05
Riviera - Varna tourism  11,00
1999 Total contractual payments
Name of the company Branch Price The biggest:
Neftochim JSCo. Bourgas chemical ind.  101,00 1 as the percent of total
privatization revenues
Petrol JSCo.-sofia Chemical ind.  52,00 3 as the percent of total
privatization revenues
Pharmacia - Dupnica pharmaceutical  11,00 5 as the percent of total
privatization revenues
Troyapharm JSCo-Troyan pharmaceutical  7,35
Sviloza - Svistov chemical ind.  7,00
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Annex No. 2
Brady Bonds, to be used in  privatization deals in Bulgaria, issued under an Agreement with the London
Club since March 1994
Front Loaded Interest Reduction Bonds (FLIRB)
Issuing date 28 July 1994
Maturity date 28 July 2012
Volume of emission USD 1 658 million
Interest coupon: Floating
- tranche ? 1 - 2-year: 2%; 3 - 4-year: 2.25%; 5-year: 2.5%; 6-year: 2.75%; 7-year: 3%; from 8-year
to date of payment: 6-month LIBOR (USD) + 13/16
- tranche ? The same scheme as  tranche ?  + additional 0.5% for each separate payment
Basis 30 / 360 for fixed interest payments and actual days number / 360 for payments with
floating interest rate
Interest payment dates 28 January and 28 July
Principal payment 8-year grace period, followed by payment scheme with 21 equal 6-month installments
starting since 29 July 2002
Interest payment collateral Allowed are investments in securities, which are denominated in USD and cover the
value of interest payments from 1 to 7-year altogether.  Volume of collateral is 2.6% 
initial principal value and the incomes are on behalf of creditors for covering one-year
interests, which are based on 3% of principal.
Collateral institution Federal Reserve Bank of New York
Face value of one bond USD 250 000
Type Global. Transferable on installments not less than USD 1 000 or divisible to USD 1 000.
In form of Payable to bearer or book entry
Place of registration Luxembourg Stock Exchange
Settlement Euroclear, Cedel or presenting sovereign bonds; Citibank for collateral securities
 Discount Bonds (DISC)
Issuing date 28 July 1994
Maturity date 28 ? ?? 2024
Volume of emission USD 1 850 million
Total volume of tranche ? USD 1 685 million
Total volume of tranche ? USD 165 million
Interest coupon: Floating
- tranche ? 6-month LIBOR (USD) + 13/16
- tranche ? 6-month LIBOR (USD) + 13/16 + 0.5%
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Basis Actual days number for the period / 360
Interest payment date 28 January and 28 July
Principal payment Single at the date of payment
Collateral:
- on principal U.S. Treasury Bonds with zero coupon and 30-year maturity.
- on interest Annually reinvested U.S. Treasury Bills with 1-year maturity, which cover the-
yearly interest payments based on 7 % of residual principal.
Collateral institution Federal Reserve Bank of New York
Face value of one bond USD 250 000
Type Global. Transferable on installments not less than USD 1 000 or divisible to USD
1 000.
In form of: Book entry
Place of registration Luxembourg Stock Exchange
Settlement Euroclear, Cedel or presenting sovereign bonds; Citibank for collateral securities.
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BG 2000192224 BG 2009993226 BG 2009893228 BG 2009794228 BG 2009693222
Date of
issuing
01.1.1992 01.7.1993 01.10.1993 01.1.1994 01.12.1993
Date of
payment
01.1.2011 01.7.2017 01.10.2018 01.1.2019 01.12.2018
Maturity in
years
19 24 25 25 25
Grace period
in years




15 20 20 20 20












BGL 3 302.08 BGL 2 301.90 BGL 8 346.69 USD 494.91 BGL 884.77
Interest
payment









LIBOR 2/3 Basic Interest
Rate
* Principal value is according to actual data of 31 December 1999
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Regulation CMD # 244/1991 CMD # 186/1993 ZUNK (art. 4) ZUNK (art. 5) CMD # 3/1994
Emission number BG 2000192224 BG 2009993226 BG 2009893228 BG 2009794228 BG 2009693222
Date of emission 01.1.1992 01.7.1993 01.10.1993 01.1.1994 01.12.1993
Maturity date 01.1.2011 01.7.2017 01.10.2018 01.1.2019 01.12.2018
Maturity (years) 19 24 25 25 25
Grace period (years) 4 4 5 5 5
Rapayment period (years) 15 20 20 20 20
Installments 15 equal 20 equal 21 equal 22 equal 23 equal
yearly yearly yearly yearly yearly
 Principal (million) 3.3 (BGN) 2.3 (BGN) 8.3 (BGN ) 494.91 (USD) 0.9 (BGN)
Interest payments every 6 months every 6 months every 6 months every 6 months yearly
Interest in 1999 BIR+1 2/3 BIR 2/3 BIR LIBOR 2/3 BIR
Note: BIR - base interest rate; principals outstanding as of 31 December 1999.
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